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Abstract
We study a non-parametric multi-armed bandit problem with stochastic covariates, where a key
complexity driver is the smoothness of payoff functions with respect to covariates. Previous studies
have focused on deriving minimax-optimal algorithms in cases where it is a priori known how smooth
the payoff functions are. In practice, however, the smoothness of payoff functions is typically not
known in advance, and misspecification of smoothness may severely deteriorate the performance of
existing methods. In this work, we consider a framework where the smoothness of payoff functions
is not known, and study when and how algorithms may adapt to unknown smoothness. First, we
establish that designing algorithms that adapt to unknown smoothness of payoff functions is, in general,
impossible. However, under a self-similarity condition (which does not reduce the minimax complexity
of the dynamic optimization problem at hand), we establish that adapting to unknown smoothness is
possible, and further devise a general policy for achieving smoothness-adaptive performance. Our
policy infers the smoothness of payoffs throughout the decision-making process, while leveraging the
structure of non-adaptive off-the-shelf policies. We establish that for problem settings with either
differentiable or non-differentiable payoff functions this policy matches (up to a logarithmic scale) the
regret rate that is achievable when the smoothness of payoffs is known a priori.
Keywords: Contextual multi-armed bandits, Ho¨lder smoothness, self-similarity, non-parametric
confidence intervals, non-parametric estimation, experiment design
1 Introduction
A well-studied dynamic optimization framework that captures the trade-off between new information
acquisition (exploration) and optimization of payoffs based on available information (exploitation), is
the multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework, originated by the work of Thompson (1933) and Robbins
(1952). An important generalization of this framework where the decision maker also has access to
covariates that can be informative about the effectiveness of different actions, is typically referred to as
the contextual MAB problem (Woodroofe 1979).1 The contextual MAB framework has been applied for
∗Correspondence: ygur@stanford.edu, amomenis@stanford.edu, swager@stanford.edu.
1Other terms that are used in the literature include bandit problem with side observations (Wang et al. 2005), and
associative bandit problem (Strehl et al. 2006).
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analyzing sequential experimentation in many application domains, including pricing (e.g., Cohen et al.
2016, Qiang and Bayati 2016, Ban and Keskin 2019, Bastani et al. 2019, Javanmard and Nazerzadeh
2019, Wang et al. 2019), product recommendations (e.g., Chu et al. 2011, Chandrashekar et al. 2017,
Bastani et al. 2018, Agrawal et al. 2019, Gur and Momeni 2019, Kallus and Udell 2020), and healthcare
(e.g., Tewari and Murphy 2017, Chick et al. 2018, Zhou et al. 2019, Bastani and Bayati 2020).
Following Woodroofe (1979), most of the analysis of contextual MAB problems assumes a parametric
(usually linear) model for the payoff functions that are associated with different actions; see, e.g.,
Goldenshluger and Zeevi (2013) and Bastani and Bayati (2020) for some notable results. Recently,
however, there has been a growing interest in studying non-parametric contextual MAB formulations,
which make less structural assumptions, are typically more robust, and can be applied to a more general
class of problems, especially when less is known about the structure of payoff functions. One of the main
findings of this line of work is that, in non-parametric MAB formulations, the smoothness of the payoff
functions is a key driver of the difficulty of the dynamic optimization problem at hand (Rigollet and
Zeevi 2010, Perchet and Rigollet 2013, Hu et al. 2019). Qualitatively, the smoother the payoff functions
are, the further one may extrapolate payoff patterns over the covariate space—and the less exploration
one requires in order to guarantee good performance.
We next illustrate this phenomenon through the problem of artwork selection on Netflix. When
Netflix recommends a title, it also needs to select an image to display along with the recommendation.
Different images may induce different probabilities to play the movie. Given the personal viewing history
of the user, for each recommended title Netflix aims to select imagery that maximizes the probability of
playing that title. A simple version of this problem is described in Chandrashekar et al. (2017) where
two different artworks are available for the movie Good Will Hunting (see the top parts of Figure 1).
In the bottom plots of Figure 1 we illustrate two different scenarios of how the probability to play the
title changes as a function of a single context for two artwork options: image A and image B.2 Let x∗
denote the context at which the optimal imagery switches. Particularly, for contexts that belong to the
interval [0, x∗] image B is the optimal imagery to display; otherwise, the optimal artwork selection is
image A. In the scenario illustrated on the bottom-left part of Figure 1, users’ behavior is smooth and
changes linearly with respect to the context. In this case, any observation of a user’s behavior, even
when the context is not close to x∗, is informative and can be utilized for estimating the probability
lines and the crossing point x∗. In contrast, the bottom-right part of Figure 1 depicts a scenario where
the probability to play each title changes more abruptly as a function of the context. In this case,
observations with contexts that are not close to x∗ are less informative and cannot be easily utilized for
2For example, this context may equal a normalized difference between the viewer’s romance and comedy scores, measures
that Netflix computes based on the viewing history of users; see Chandrashekar et al. (2017) for more details.
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Figure 1: Top: Example of artwork selection on Netflix for recommending the movie Good Will Hunting (for
details and discussion see Chandrashekar et al. 2017); Bottom: The probability of users to play the recommended
title as a function of the normalized difference of their romance and comedy score (context) when either image A
(dashed line) or image B (dotted line) is shown, in two different scenarios: (Bottom Left) users’ behavior changes
linearly as a function of the context; Bottom Right: users’ behavior changes more abruptly as a function of the
context. In each case x∗ denotes the context at which the optimal imagery switches.
estimating the crossing point x∗. As a result, the second scenario requires more experimentation over
the context space in order to determine optimal decision regions. When payoffs are not monotone or
smooth functions of the contexts, optimal decisions regions might be non-convex and complex to identify,
and required experimentation rates further increase.
Previous studies of non-parametric contextual MAB problems typically assume prior knowledge of
the worst-case smoothness of payoff functions. A standard approach is to assume that payoff functions
are (β, L)-Ho¨lder (see Definition 2.1) for some known parameters β and L, and develop policies that
are predicated on this assumption. For example, Rigollet and Zeevi (2010) and Perchet and Rigollet
(2013) develop minimax rate-optimal algorithms when payoff functions are assumed to be Lipschitz or
“rougher” (that is, when 0 < β ≤ 1); more recently, Hu, Kallus, and Mao (2019) extended this analysis to
the “smoother” case (where β > 1).
In practice, however, the class of functions to which payoff functions belong is often unknown, and
misspecification of smoothness may cause significant deterioration in the performance of existing methods
(see Example 1 in §2.2). While underestimating the smoothness of payoff functions leads to excessive and
unnecessary experimentation, overestimating the smoothness might lead to insufficient experimentation;
both cases may result in poor performance relative to the one that could have been achieved with
accurate information on the smoothness. The focus of this paper is in studying when and how algorithms
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may adapt to unknown smoothness, in the sense of achieving, without prior knowledge of the smoothness
of payoffs, the best performance that is achievable when smoothness is a priori known.
Main contributions. Our contributions are in (1) formulating a non-parametric contextual MAB
problem where the smoothness of payoff functions is a priori unknown; (2) analyzing the complexity of
adapting to smoothness, and establishing that smoothness-adaptivity is in general impossible; and (3)
identifying a self-similarity condition that makes it possible to achieve smoothness-adaptivity, and devising
a general policy that leverages this condition to guarantee rate-optimality without prior information on
the smoothness of payoffs. More specifically, our contribution is along the following lines.
(1) Modeling. We formulate a non-parametric contextual MAB problem where the smoothness of payoff
functions is a priori unknown: the payoff functions are assumed to belong to a Ho¨lder class of functions
with some unknown Ho¨lder exponent. We identify a policy as smoothness-adaptive if for any problem
instance it guarantees the optimal regret rate as a function of the Ho¨lder exponent that characterizes that
instance, up to a multiplicative term that is poly-logarithmic in the horizon length and a multiplicative
constant that may depend on other problem parameters (such as the dimension of the covariate space);
see Definition 2.4. In that sense, smoothness-adaptive policies guarantee (up to a logarithmic factor)
the minimax regret that characterizes the achievable performance when the smoothness parameter is a
priori known. Our formulation allows for any arbitrary range of this smoothness parameter, and thus
captures a large variety of real-world phenomena.
(2) Impossibility of adaptation. We establish a lower bound on the best achievable performance
when two different classes of payoff functions (characterized by two different smoothness exponents) are
considered simultaneously. Through this lower bound we show that adaptively achieving rate-optimal
performance uniformly over different classes of smooth payoff functions is impossible. In that sense,
adapting to unknown smoothness carries non-trivial cost in sequential experimentation. This is despite
the fact that smoothness-adaptive estimation of non-parametric functions is possible (see, e.g., Lepskii
1992). Thus, this impossibility result highlights the fundamental difference between the complexities of
non-parametric function estimation and non-parametric contextual MAB.
(3) Smoothness-adaptivity and policy design under self-similar payoffs. To advance beyond the general
impossibility of adapting to unknown smoothness, we turn to consider smoothness-adaptivity when
payoff functions are self-similar. Self-similarity has been used for studying adaptivity problems in the
statistics literature; for example, while constructing smoothness-adaptive confidence bands is impossible
in general (Low 1997), it becomes possible under a self-similarity assumption (Gine´ and Nickl 2010).
While we establish that self-similarity does not reduce the minimax complexity of the problem at hand,
we show that, when payoffs are self-similar, it is possible to design smoothness-adaptive policies. We
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further devise a general policy that, under self-similarity, guarantees rate-optimal performance without
prior information on the smoothness of payoffs. Our policy efficiently estimates the smoothness of
self-similar payoff functions throughout the sequential decision process, while leveraging the structure of
effective off-the-shelf non-adaptive policies that are designed to perform well under accurate smoothness
specification. We establish that, when paired with off-the-shelf input policies that guarantee the optimal
regret rate under accurate smoothness specification, our policy guarantees (up to a logarithmic factor)
the latter regret rate without any prior information on the smoothness of payoffs. We demonstrate our
approach by leveraging non-adaptive policies designed for payoff functions that are at most Lipschitz-
smooth (Perchet and Rigollet 2013) and at least Lipschitz-smooth (Hu et al. 2019) to guarantee
rate-optimal performance without prior information on the underlying payoff smoothness.
1.1 Related literature
Parametric and non-parametric approaches in contextual MAB. Most of the literature on
contextual bandits assume parametric payoff functions. Some researchers have studied this setting
when contexts are independently drawn from identical distribution. For example, Goldenshluger and
Zeevi (2013), Bastani et al. (2017), and Bastani and Bayati (2020) consider linear payoff functions. On
the other hand, Langford and Zhang (2008) and Dudik et al. (2011) study the problem of finding the
best mapping from contexts to arms among a finite set of hypotheses. In addition, Wang et al. (2005)
considers a general relationships between the parameters of payoff functions and contexts. In contrast to
these studies, some other papers consider settings with contexts that are selected by an adversary ; see
Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012) and references therein.
In addition to these parametric approaches, the contextual MAB problem has also been addressed
from a non-parametric point of view to account for general relationships between covariates and mean
rewards. Yang and Zhu (2002), which initiated this line of research, combined an -greedy-type policy
with non-parametric estimation methods such as nearest neighbors to achieve strong consistency. This
solution concept ensures that the total reward collected by the agent is almost surely asymptotically
equivalent to those obtained by always pulling the best arm. Following this work, stronger results have
been established for the regret rate. Rigollet and Zeevi (2010) introduced the UCBogram policy which
decomposes the covariates space into bins and follows a traditional UCB policy in each bin separately.
Perchet and Rigollet (2013) improved upon this result by introducing the Adaptively Binned Successive
Elimination (ABSE) policy, which implements an increasing refinement of the covariate space and achieves
the minimax regret rate. Recently, Hu et al. (2019) extended this framework to the case of smooth
differentiable functions. Finally, Reeve et al. (2018) proposes a kNN-UCB policy that achieves the
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minimax regret rate and also adapts to the intrinsic dimension of data. All these studies, however,
assume that the smoothness of the payoff functions is known a priori.
Adaptive non-parametric methods. For the general theory on adaptive non-parametric estimation
we refer the readers to Lepskii (1992). This line of research includes various approaches: For example,
Donoho and Johnstone (1994), Donoho et al. (1995), and Juditsky (1997) deploy techniques based on
wavelets, Lepski et al. (1997) proposes a kernel-based method, and Goldenshluger and Nemirovski (1997)
develops a method that is based on local polynomial regression.
A related line of research studies the construction of adaptive non-parametric confidence intervals.
The work of Low (1997) showed that, in general, it is impossible to construct adaptive confidence bands
simultaneously over different classes of Ho¨lder functions; for recent results on the impossibility of adaptive
confidence intervals, see Armstrong and Kolesa´r (2018) and references therein. Following that work,
several studies have focused on identifying conditions under which adaptive confidence band construction
is feasible. A well-studied condition is the one of self-similarity, which was first used in this context by
Picard and Tribouley (2000) using wavelet methods for point-wise purposes. Later on, self-similarity
was also used by Gine´ and Nickl (2010) to construct confidence bounds over finite intervals. Aside from
these two works, self-similarity has also been used in a variety of other non-parametric problems and
applications, including high-dimensional sparse signal estimation (Nickl and van de Geer 2013), binary
regression (Mukherjee and Sen 2018), and Lp-confidence sets (Nickl and Szabo´ 2016), etc.
In a contextual MAB setting, Qian and Yang (2016) were the first to consider a self-similarity condition
for establishing performance guarantees without precise smoothness knowledge in a non-differentiable
case (with 0 < β ≤ 1). We note that even in that case the method they provide is not smoothness-
adaptive in the sense that is defined in the current paper (particularly, the optimality gap they suggest
scales exponentially with the context dimension). In that respect, one may view the current paper
as further grounding self-similarity as an important condition for adapting to unknown smoothness
through: (i) establishing that, in general, smoothness-adaptive policy design is impossible without
imposing additional conditions; (ii) showing that self-similarity assumption does not reduce the minimax
complexity of the problem; and (iii) showing that self-similarity can be leveraged in a new way that
allows the design of smoothness-adaptive policies for a general class of problems.
2 Problem formulation
We next formulate the non-parametric contextual MAB problem with unknown smoothness. §2.1 includes
main modelling assumptions. In §2.2 we discuss and illustrate the performance reduction that is caused
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by misspecifying the smoothness in existing methods. In §2.3 we formalize the adaptivity notion that is
used as a policy design goal in the analysis that will follow.
Reward and feedback structure. Let K = {1, 2} be a set of actions (arms) and let T = {1, . . . , T}
denote a sequence of decision epochs.3 At each time period t ∈ T , a decision maker observes a context
Xt ∈ [0, 1]d that is realized according to an unknown distribution PX , and then selects one of the two
actions. When selecting an action k ∈ K at time t ∈ T , a reward Yk,t ∼ P(k)Y |X is realized and observed
such that Yk,t ∈ {0, 1}, where P(k)Y |X denotes the payoff distribution conditional on the context Xt and
the selected action k. Equivalently, the rewards Yk,t may be expressed as follows:
Yk,t = fk(Xt) + k,t,
where fk(Xt) = E [Yk,t | Xt] and k,t is a random variable such that E [k,t | Xt] = 0. The conditional
distributions P
(k)
Y |X and the payoff functions fk are assumed to be unknown.
Admissible policies. Let U be a random variable defined over probability space (U,U ,Pu). Let
pit : [0, 1]
d×t × [0, 1]t−1 × U→ K for t = 1, 2, 3, . . . be a sequence of measurable functions given by
pit =
pi1(X1, U) t = 1,pit(Xt, . . . , X1, Yt−1, . . . , Y1, U) t = 2, 3, . . . .
(We abuse notation by also denoting the action at time t by pit ∈ K.) The mappings {pit; t = 1, . . . , T}
and the distribution Pu together define the class of admissible policies, denoted by Π.
Performance. For a problem instance P =
(
PX ,P
(1)
Y |X ,P
(2)
Y |X
)
let pi∗(P) = (pi∗t (P); t = 1, 2, . . . ) denote
the oracle rule, which under knowledge of the problem instance P (including the functions fk), prescribes
at each period t the best action given the realized context Xt; that is, pi
∗
t (P) = arg maxk∈K fk(Xt) for
all t ∈ T . The performance of a policy pi = {pit; t = 1, . . . , T} is measured in terms of expected regret
relative to the oracle performance:
Rpi(P;T ) := Epi
[
T∑
t=1
fpi∗t (P)(Xt)− fpit(Xt)
]
.
A prominent characteristic of a given problem instance P that directly impacts achievable regret, is the
smoothness with which the payoffs functions f1 and f2, and correspondingly, the conditional distributions
P
(k)
Y |X and P
(2)
Y |X , vary over the covariate space. This characteristic is formulated in §2.1, along with
other key model assumptions.
3We focus here on a setting with two actions only to simplify exposition and analysis; we expect all the results to hold
for any action set of finite cardinality.
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2.1 Model assumptions
We next detail our main model assumptions, which are conventional in the non-parametric contextual
MAB literature (see, e.g., Perchet and Rigollet 2013). Our first model assumption addresses the
smoothness of payoff functions. Before advancing it, we first formalize how payoff functions can change as
a function of the covariates using Ho¨lder smoothness. For any multi-index s = (s1, . . . , sd) ∈ Nd and any
x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd, we define |s|=
∑d
i=1 si, s! = s1! . . . sd!, x
s = xs11 . . . x
sd
d , and ‖x‖=
(
x21 + · · ·+ x2d
) 1
2 .
Let Ds denote the differential operator Ds := ∂
s1+···+sd
∂x
s1
1 ...∂x
sd
d
. Let β > 0. Denote by bβc the maximal
integer that is strictly less than β, e.g., b1c = 0. For any x ∈ Rd and any bβc times continuously
differentiable function g(·) on Rd, we denote by gx its Taylor expansion of degree bβc at point x:
gx(x
′) :=
∑
|s|≤bβc
(x−x′)s
s! D
sg(x).
Definition 2.1 (Ho¨lder functions). The Ho¨lder class of functions HX (β, L) for the parameters β > 0 and
L > 0 and the set X ⊆ Rd is defined as the set of functions f : X → R that are bβc times continuously
differentiable, and for any x, x′ ∈ X , satisfy the following inequality:
∣∣f(x′)− fx(x′)∣∣ ≤ L‖x− x′‖β∞.
Furthermore, let HX (β) :=
⋃
0≤L<∞
HX (β, L). We drop the indication X whenever X = [0, 1]d.
Assumption 1 (Smoothness). The payoff functions fk, k ∈ K, belong to the Ho¨lder class of functions
H(β, L) for some L > 0 and β ∈ [β, β¯] with 0 < β ≤ 1.
Our second assumption requires the distribution of contexts to be bounded from above and away from
zero. Consequently, in every region of the covariate space, sufficiently many samples can be collected in
order to estimate the payoff functions.
Assumption 2 (Covariate distribution). The distribution PX is equivalent to the Lebesgue measure on
[0, 1]d, that is, there exist constants 0 < ρ ≤ ρ¯ such that pX , the density of PX , satisfies ρ ≤ pX(x) ≤ ρ¯
for all x ∈ [0, 1]d.
Our third assumption, known as the margin condition, captures the interplay between the payoff functions
and the covariate distribution.
Assumption 3 (Margin condition). There exist some α > 0 and C0 > 0 such that
PX {0 < |f1(X)− f2(X)| ≤ δ} ≤ C0δα, ∀ 0 < δ ≤ 1.
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The mass of covariates near the decision boundary is a key complexity driver: the larger the parameter α,
the faster this mass shrinks near the boundary, and the hardness of the problem reduces. Together, the
above three assumptions characterize the general class of problems that we consider.
Definition 2.2 (Class of problems). For any β ≥ 0 and α ≥ 0, we denote by P(β, α, d) = P(β, L, α,C0, ρ, ρ¯)
the class of problems P =
(
PX ,P
(1)
Y |X ,P
(2)
Y |X
)
that satisfy Assumption 1 for β and L > 0, Assumption 2
for some ρ¯ ≥ ρ > 0, and Assumption 3 for α and some C0 > 0.
It is worth noting the relation between the smoothness condition and the margin condition. The
smoothness of payoff functions also determines how they might change near the decision boundary, which
affects the mass of contexts in that region. That is, smooth payoff functions (large β) implies more
mass of contexts near the decision boundary (small α). This relationship is formalized in the following
proposition, which is a simple extension of Proposition 3.1 in Perchet and Rigollet (2013).
Proposition 2.3 (Margin condition and smoothness). Assume that Assumption 1 holds with parameters
(β, L), and that Assumption 3 holds with parameter α. Then, the following statements hold:
1. If α ·min {1, β} > 1 then, a given action is always or never optimal; the oracle policy pi∗ dictates
pulling only one of the actions all the time;
2. If α ·min {1, β} ≤ 1 then, there exits problem instances in P(β, α, d) with non-trivial oracle policies.
Based on this proposition, when α > 1min{1,β} , the problem becomes equivalent to the classical stochastic
MAB problem without covariates. Hence, we will assume 0 < α ≤ 1min{1,β} in the rest of the paper.
2.2 The cost of smoothness misspecification
We next demonstrate the loss that might be incurred by existing policies when the smoothness is
misspecified. When the problem instance belongs to P(β, α, d), the minimax regret is:
inf
pi∈Π
sup
P∈P(β,α,d)
Rpi(P;T ) = Θ
(
T ζ(β,α,d)
)
, where ζ(β, α, d) = 1− β(1 + α)
2β + d
. (2.1)
This characterization was established by Rigollet and Zeevi (2010) and Perchet and Rigollet (2013) in
the case β ≤ 1. With further assumptions on the regularity of the decision regions, Hu et al. (2019)
establish a similar characterization for β > 1, up to an additional multiplicative term of (log T )
2β+d
2β that
appears in their upper bound.
Perchet and Rigollet (2013) provide the ABSE policy and establish that, when tuned with the correct
smoothness parameter, it guarantees the minimax regret rate in (2.1) whenever β ≤ 1. The design of
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the ABSE policy and the performance it achieves are nevertheless predicated on accurate knowledge of
smoothness. The following example demonstrates that when the smoothness parameter is misspecified,
the ABSE policy cannot guarantee rate-optimality anymore.
Example 1 (Cost of smoothness misspecification for ABSE). Fix a smoothness parameter 0 < β ≤ 1
and a margin parameter α ≤ 1β . Let ABSE(βˆ) denote the ABSE policy tuned by a misspecified smoothness
parameter 0 < βˆ ≤ 1. Then, there exist constants CABSE and T0 independent of T such that for all
T ≥ T0, the followings hold:
1. If βˆ < β ≤ 1, then sup
P∈P(β,α,d)
RABSE(βˆ)(P;T ) ≥ CABSET ζ(βˆ,α,d);
2. If 0 < β < βˆ, then sup
P∈P(β,α,d)
RABSE(βˆ)(P;T ) ≥ CABSET.
When smoothness is underestimated, the worst-case regret rate is equal to the minimax regret rate
over the class of problems with “rougher” payoff functions, and when smoothness is overestimated,
the worst-case regret is linear in the horizon length. Similar results can be obtained for other policies
proposed in the literature, including for the case β > 1; in §3 we provide a broad impossibility result
that generalizes this example.
2.3 The smoothness-adaptive property
Next, we formalize a notion of adaptivity as our policy design goal. We say that a policy is smoothness-
adaptive if for any problem instance, it achieves the optimal regret rate as a function of the Ho¨lder
exponent β that characterizes that instance, up to a multiplicative term that is poly-logarithmic in the
horizon length and a multiplicative constant that may depend on other problem parameters.4
Definition 2.4 (Smoothness-adaptive policies). Fix two Ho¨lder exponents β < β¯, and dimension d.
Define:
Pall := Pall(β, β¯, d) =
⋃
β≤β≤β¯
⋃
0<α≤1∨ 1
β
P(β, α, d).
Given a family of problem instances P ⊆ Pall, a policy pi ∈ Π is said to be smoothness-adaptive if for
any β ≤ β ≤ β¯ and 0 < α ≤ 1min{1,β} , there exists some function ι(β, β, β¯, α) > 0 independent of d, and
some constant C¯ > 0 such that
sup
P∈P∩P(β,α,d)
Rpi(P;T ) ≤ C¯ (log T )ι(β,β,β¯,α) T ζ(β,α,d),
where the function ζ(β, α, d) is given in (2.1).
4We note that a similar property has been suggested and analyzed in the context of adaptive confidence bands; see, e.g.,
Nickl and van de Geer (2013).
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Smoothness-adaptive policies guarantee (up to a logarithmic factor) the minimax regret that characterizes
the achievable performance when smoothness parameters are a priori known.
3 Impossibility of costless adaptation to smoothness
In this section, we discuss the possibility of adapting to the smoothness of payoff functions. The objective
we consider is to design policies that are smoothness-adaptive (see Definition 2.4), that is, achieve the
rate of convergence detailed in (2.1) without prior knowledge of the best smoothness parameter β that
characterizes all the payoff functions {fk}. Our first key result, however, shows that this is impossible.
In the following analysis we consider a setting with a pair of smoothness parameters 0 < β < γ, for
which we know that P is β-smooth, i.e., P ∈ P(β, α, d), but we do not know whether P is also γ-smooth,
i.e., whether P ∈ P(γ, α, d). We show that there exist pairs (β, γ) such that any admissible policy pi
that (nearly) achieves the optimal regret rate over the smoother class P(γ, α, d), cannot simultaneously
(nearly) achieve optimal rates over the rougher one. Therefore, without imposing additional requirements
over the class of problems P(β, α, d), no admissible policy can be smoothness-adaptive.
Theorem 3.1 (Impossibility of adapting to smoothness). Fix two Ho¨lder exponents 0 < β < γ and
some margin parameter 0 < α ≤ max{1, 1γ }. Then, for any horizon length T ≥ T0, with T0 independent
of T , and any admissible policy pi ∈ Π that achieves rate-optimal regret O (T ζ(γ,α,d)) over P(γ, α, d),
there exists a constant C > 0 independent of T such that the followings hold:
1. (At most Lipschitz-smooth) If 0 < β < γ ≤ 1 then,
sup
P∈P(β,α,d)
Rpi(P;T ) ≥ CT 1− dα(2β+d−αβ)
[
T ζ(γ,α,d)
]− d
2β+d−αβ
;
2. (At least Lipschitz-smooth) If β = 1 < γ then,
sup
P∈P(1,α,d)
Rpi(P;T ) ≥ CT 1− 12α
[
T ζ(γ,α,d)
]− 1
2
.
Theorem 3.1 establishes a lower bound on the achievable performance over a class of problems as a
function of the performance over another class of problems with smoother payoff functions. This lower
bound depends on the smoothness parameters of the two considered classes of payoff functions and also
the margin parameter. As the examples below illustrate, Theorem 3.1 implies that there exist pairs of
smoothness parameters across which adaptivity is impossible without further assumptions.
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Example 2 (At most Lipschitz-smooth). Part 1 of Theorem 3.1 can be simplified as follows:
sup
P∈P(β,α,d)
Rpi(P;T ) ≥ C ′T 1−
d(α+1)(2γ+d−αγ)
α(2γ+d)(2β+d−αβ) ,
for some constant C ′ > 0. Thus, if γ = 15100 , β =
γ
2 , α =
99
100γ and d = 1, the optimal regret rate with
knowledge of smoothness over P(β, α, 1) is O(T 0.504348), while Part 1 of Theorem 3.1 establishes a lower
bound of order Ω
(
T 0.58
)
if the policy pi achieves rate-optimal performance over P(γ, α, 1).
Example 3 (At least Lipschitz-smooth). Part 2 of Theorem 3.1 can be simplified as follows:
sup
P∈P(1,α,d)
Rpi(P;T ) ≥ C ′T 1−
(2+α−α2)γ+(α+1)d
2α(2γ+d) ,
for some constant C ′ > 0. Thus, if γ > 1, α = 1 and d = 1, the optimal regret rate with knowledge of
smoothness over P(1, 1, 1) is O(T 13 ), while Part 2 of Theorem 3.1 establishes a lower bound of order
Ω
(
T
γ
2γ+1
)
if the policy pi achieves rate-optimal performance over P(γ, 1, 1). Since γ2γ+1 > 13 for any
γ > 1, no policy can be simultaneously rate-optimal over both P(1, 1, 1) and P(γ, 1, 1), for γ > 1.
We note that Theorem 3.1 rules out adaptivity across some, but not necessarily all, pairs of smoothness
parameters 0 < β < γ. Understanding whether there exist some pairs over which adaptivity is possible—
and, more broadly, providing a comprehensive characterization of adaptive rates over mixtures of Holder
classes—would be of considerable interest. In the current paper, however, we leave these questions to
future work. In the next sections we turn our focus to payoff functions that are self-similar and show
that—in this case—there exist policies that are smoothness-adaptive with considerable generality.
Key ideas in the proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof of Theorem 3.1 adapts to our framework ideas
of identifying a worst-case nature “strategy,” while devising a novel construction of instances to reduce
the problem to one of hypothesis testing. The proof of Part 1 of the theorem is detailed in §7; the
proof of Part 2 is deferred to the appendix, together with the proofs of all subsequent results. We next
illustrate the key ideas of the proof, focusing on Part 1, in the special case of α = 1γ and d = 1; the
construction of the worst-case instance in this setting is depicted in Figure 2.
Fix a parameter ∆ ≤ 14 . First, consider a nominal problem instance in P(γ, α, 1), such that the first
action’s payoff function is 12 for every context, except for the interval [0, 2∆
1
γ ], where it has a “downward
bump” and reaches its minimum, 12 − ∆, and the second action’s payoff function is 12 everywhere.
Furthermore, for each 1 ≤ m ≤M := b∆ 1γ− 1β c, consider a problem instance in P(β, α, 1) such that the
payoff functions are equal to the aforementioned payoff functions everywhere except for the interval
Im := [2(m− 1)∆
1
β , 2m∆
1
β ], where the first action’s payoff function has an “upward bump” and reaches
12
its maximum, 12 + ∆, as depicted in Figure 2. That is, for the problem m, the first action is optimal over
some segment of Im. To meet its performance guarantees over P(γ, α, 1), in at least one of the intervals
Im, the number of times pi selects action 1 must be “small.” We denote one such interval by Im∗. Using
this observation along with the fact that one can differentiate between the nominal problem described
above and problem instance m∗ only based on the outcomes of action 1 in the interval Im∗, one may
show that any admissible policy cannot distinguish between these two problem instances with strictly
positive probability. This causes such policy not to select action 1 almost half of the times in which
realized contexts belong to the interval I∗m. Interval I∗m contains a segment over which the first action is
optimal for the problem m∗, which guarantees the regret bound stated in the theorem for a carefully
selected value for the parameter ∆.
2Δ#$ 𝑥0
12 − Δ
12
Δ#$ 2Δ#$ 𝑥0
12 − Δ
12
Δ#$
12 + Δ
𝐼+
Figure 2: Description of the worst-case instance constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Left: The first arm’s
payoff function for the problem in P(γ, α, 1); Right: The first arm’s payoff function for the problem in P(β, α, 1).
4 Self-similar payoffs
In this section we first adapt in §4.1 a self-similarity condition that appears in the literature on non-
parametric confidence bands (e.g., Picard and Tribouley 2000 and Gine´ and Nickl 2010), and then show
in §4.2 that the assumption that payoff functions are self-similar does not reduce the minimax regret
complexity of the problem at hand. Later on, in §5, we will show that self-similarity makes it possible to
guarantee rate-optimality without prior knowledge of the payoff smoothness, and devise a general policy
for achieving smoothness-adaptive performance.
4.1 The self-similarity assumption
Before introducing the self-similarity condition we first advance some relevant notation. For a given
function f(·) and non-negative integers l and p, define Γpl f(·;U) to be the L2(PX)-projection of the
function f(·) to the class of polynomial functions of degree at most p over the hypercube U . Formally,
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for any x ∈ U we define:
Γpl f(x;U) := g(x), s.t. g = arg min
q∈Poly(p)
∫
U
|f(u)− q(u)|2K
(
x− u
h
)
pX(u | U)du, (4.1)
where we use kernel K(·) = 1 {‖·‖∞≤ 1} and bandwidth h = 2−l, and Poly(p) is the class of polynomials
of degree at most p. Next, we formalize the notion of self-similarity using the projection Γpl f . For an
integer l ≥ 0, let Bl :=
{
Bm, m = 1, . . . , 2
ld
}
be a re-indexed collection of the hypercubes:
Bm = Bm :=
{
x ∈ [0, 1]d : mi − 1
2l
≤ xi ≤ mi
2l
, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
}
,
for m = (m1, . . . ,md) with mi ∈ {1, . . . , 2l}.
Definition 4.1 (self-similarity). A set of payoff functions {fk}k∈K is said to be self-similar if fk ∈ H(β),
k ∈ K, for some β ∈ [β, β¯], and there exist some positive integer l0 and some constant b > 0 such that
for any l ≥ l0 and integer bβc ≤ p ≤ bβ¯c,
max
B∈Bl
max
k∈K
sup
x∈B
∣∣Γpl fk(x;B)− fk(x)∣∣ ≥ b2−lβ.
One may view the self-similarity condition as complementing the Ho¨lder smoothness (Assumption 1) in
the following way. On the one hand, Ho¨lder smoothness implies an upper bound on the estimation bias
of payoff functions at every point (estimation bias refers to the absolute difference between the value
of a function and the expected value of its estimator, using, e.g., local polynomial regression). On the
other hand, the above self-similarity condition effectively implies a global lower bound on the estimation
bias. More precisely, self-similarity implies that for a set of β-smooth payoffs, the estimation bias is
guaranteed to be at least of order hβ for bandwidth h > 0. This provides an opportunity to estimate
the smoothness of payoff functions by “comparing” estimation variance and bias (for further details see
discussion in §5.2.1). The next example illustrates a set of self-similar payoff functions.
Example 4 (Self-similar payoffs). Fix some β ≤ 1 = β¯ and let f1(x) = xβ and f2(x) = 12 for all
x ∈ [0, 1]. Then, fk ∈ H(β), k ∈ K. Furthermore, for any l ≥ 1 and p = 0, one has
max
B∈Bl
max
k∈K
sup
x∈B
∣∣Γpl fk(x;B)− fk(x)∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣ 12−l
∫ 2−l
0
f1(x)dx− f1(0)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1β + 12−lβ =: b2−lβ.
Figure 3 depicts the payoff functions detailed in Example 4. We next provide the self-similarity
assumption, followed by a formulation of the class of problem instances with self-similar payoff functions,
which is a subset of the more general class from Definition 2.2.
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𝑓! 𝑥 = 𝑥"
𝑓# 𝑥 = 12
Figure 3: An instance of the self-similar set of payoff functions given in Example 4.
Assumption 4 (Self-similar payoffs). The set of payoff functions {fk}k∈K is self-similar.
Definition 4.2 (Class of problems with self-similar payoffs). For any β ≤ 1, β¯ > β, β ∈ [β, β¯], and
α ≥ 0, we define by Pss(β, β¯, β, α, d) := {P ∈ P(β, α, d) : P satisfies Assumption 4} the class of problems
with self-similar payoffs.
4.2 Minimax complexity with self-similar payoffs
While Example 4 illustrates a set of particularly simple payoff functions, we note that the class of
self-similar payoffs is quite general and includes many different payoff structures. In fact, we next
show that the minimax complexity of the dynamic optimization problem at hand does not reduce by
introducing the self-similarity condition.
We establish this result by constructing regret lower bounds that are of the same order as in (2.1). To
do so, we design worst-case instances consisting of payoff functions that satisfy Assumption 4. More
precisely, we show that worst-case instances developed in Rigollet and Zeevi (2010) for the case of β ≤ 1
and in Hu et al. (2019) for the case of β ≥ 1 can essentially be constructed using self-similar payoffs.
For consistency with the setting in Hu et al. (2019) that allows a more general structure for the
support of the covariate distribution in the case of β ≥ 1, we denote by P˜ss(β, β¯, β, α, d) the class of
problems with self-similar payoffs where the covariate density pX has a compact support X ⊆ [0, 1]d; for
further details see Appendix A.3.
Theorem 4.3 (Self-similarity assumption does not reduce the minimax complexity). Fix some non-
integer Ho¨lder exponent β ∈ [β, β¯], and some margin parameter α > 0 such that α ≤ max{1, 1β} and
αβ ≤ d. Then, there exist T0, C > 0 such that for any horizon length T ≥ T0 and any admissible policy
pi ∈ Π, then followings hold:
1. (At most Lipschitz-smooth) If β ≤ 1 then,
sup
P∈Pss(β,β¯,β,α,d)
Rpi(P;T ) ≥ CT 1−
β(α+1)
2β+d .
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2. (At least Lipschitz-smooth) If β ≥ 1 then,
sup
P∈P˜ss(β,β¯,β,α,d)
Rpi(P;T ) ≥ CT 1−
β(α+1)
2β+d .
Theorem 4.3 establishes that requiring payoff functions to be self-similar does not reduce the minimax
(regret) complexity, and therefore implies that the minimax complexity of the problem under self-similar
payoffs (Assumption 4) is still as stated in (2.1). Nevertheless, in the next section we establish that under
self-similar payoffs one may design policies that are smoothness-adaptive, and essentially guarantee that
minimax regret rate without prior information on the smoothness of payoff functions.
5 Adaptivity to smoothness
In this section, we first detail in §5.1 the main result of the section, establishing that under self-similar
payoffs one may guarantee smoothness-adaptive performance. This result is based on providing a
Smoothness-Adaptive Contextual Bandits (SACB) policy, and establishing that this policy is smoothness-
adaptive. In §5.2 we then provide a detailed description of the SACB policy and discuss its key components.
5.1 Smoothness-adaptive performance with self-similar payoffs
We next detail the main results of this section. We show that the Smoothness-Adaptive Contextual Bandits
(SACB) policy (that is detailed in §5.2, see Algorithm 1) is smoothness-adaptive under Assumption 4.
The key idea of the SACB policy lies in observing that local polynomial regression estimation of any
function f(·) cannot largely deviate from the projection Γpl f with high probability. That is, Assumption 4
is key in establishing that for a set of Ho¨lder smooth payoff functions, not only is the estimation bias
bounded from above, but also this bias cannot shrink fast (see further discussion and analysis in
Appendix C). This suggests an opportunity to estimate the smoothness of the payoff functions by
appropriately examining the estimation bias against its variance over the unit cube.
The SACB policy adaptively integrates a smoothness estimation sub-routine with some collection of
non-adaptive policies {pi0(β0)}β0∈[β,β¯] that are rate-optimal under accurate tuning of the smoothness
parameter. The estimation sub-routine of SACB consists of three steps: (i) collecting samples over the
covariate space; (ii) estimating the payoff functions; and (iii) conducting a hypothesis test. After the
estimation sub-routine is terminated, the produced estimate βˆSACB is used to choose the corresponding
rate-optimal non-adaptive policy pi
(βˆSACB)
0 . The following result characterizes the quality of the smoothness
estimation of the SACB policy.
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Theorem 5.1 (Smoothness estimation under self-similarity). Suppose Assumption 1 holds for some L > 0
and β ∈ [β, β¯], and Assumption 4 holds for some b > 0 and l0 ≥ 0. Then, there exists T0 > 0 independent
of T such that for any horizon length T ≥ T0 the SACB policy detailed in Algorithm 1, run with tunning
parameter γ > 0, computes an estimate of β, denoted by βˆSACB, by time step t =
⌈
4
ρ (log T )
2d
β
+4
T
(β+d−1)
(2β+d)
⌉
with probability at least 1− 2TC1 exp (−C2TC3), such that:
P
{
βˆSACB ∈ [β − 3(2β + d)
2 log2 log T
(β + d− 1) log2 T
, β]
}
≥ 1− C4 (log T )
d
β T−γ
2C5+C6 ,
where the constants C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, and C6 depend only on β, β¯, b, L, ρ, ρ¯, and d.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows from Propositions 5.6 and 5.7 that will be advanced in §5.2.1 for
analyzing the performance of the smoothness estimation subroutine in the SACB policy. Theorem 5.1
implies that the error of the smoothness estimate grows linearly with the covariate dimension and
decays as a function of the time horizon at a rate of log log Tlog T . This characterization of the smoothness
estimation is leveraged in the next theorem to establish that, when coupled with appropriate off-the-shelf
non-adaptive policies, the SACB policy guarantees optimal regret rate up to poly-logarithmic terms, and
smoothness-adaptive performance as stated in Definition 2.4.
Theorem 5.2 (Smoothness-adaptive policy under self-similarity). Let pi be the SACB policy detailed in
Algorithm 1, and let {pi0(β0)}β0∈[β,β¯] be a set of non-adaptive policies such that if initialized with the
true smoothness parameter, for any β ≤ β0 ≤ β¯, α ≤ 1min{1,β0} , and T ≥ 1, it satisfies
sup
P∈P(β0,α,d)
Rpi0(β0)(P;T ) ≤ C¯0 (log T )ι0(β0,α,d) T ζ(β0,α,d),
for some ι0(β0, α, d) and a constant C¯0 > 0 that is independent of T , where the function ζ(β0, α, d) is
given in (2.1). Consider a problem instance P ∈ Pss(β, β¯, β, α, d) with β ≤ β ≤ β¯ and α ≤ 1min{1,β} .
Then, there exist γ0, and C¯ > 0 such that for any tuning parameter γ ≥ γ0 and horizon length:
Rpi(P;T ) ≤ C¯ (log T )
3d(α+1)(2β+d)2
(2β+d)(β+d)(β+d−1)+ι0
(
β− 3(2β+d)2 log2 log T
(β+d−1) log2 T ,α,d
)
T ζ(β,α,d).
The proof of Theorem 5.2 follows from observing that, with high probability, the number of time periods
that are required in order to generate the smoothness estimate (and thus the regret that is incurred
throughout the smoothness estimation process) is “small” relative to the optimal regret rate, and from
plugging the lower confidence bound established in Theorem 5.1 for the smoothness estimate into the
regret rate of the non-adaptive policy pi0.
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When the policy pi0 that is deployed in the SACB policy is rate-optimal in the sense that ι0(β, α, d) = 0
then, the resulting SACB policy is smoothness-adaptive according to Definition 2.4. More precisely,
the adaptation cost for the SACB policy is poly-logarithmic in the horizon length with the degree
3d(α+1)(2β+d)2
(2β+d)(β+d)(β+d−1) , which is bounded from above for any dimension d, and hence, can be replaced by
some function ι(β, β, β¯, α) independent of d as required in Definition 2.4. We next demonstrate this for
the cases of at most Lipschitz-smooth and at least Lipschitz-smooth payoffs.
5.1.1 Rate-optimality with at most Lipschitz-smooth payoffs
When the estimated smoothness in the SACB policy is less than 1, that is, βˆSACB ≤ 1, one may deploy
the Adaptively Binned Successive Elimination (ABSE) policy from Perchet and Rigollet (2013) as the
input non-adaptive policy pi0 to guarantee rate-optimal performance without prior information on the
smoothness. This is formalized by the following Corollary.
Corollary 5.3 (Rate optimality with at most Lipschitz-smooth payoffs). Consider the setting in Theorem
5.2, and suppose pi0(β0) = ABSE(min(1, β0)) then,
Rpi(P;T ) ≤ C¯T ζ(β,α,d) (log T )
3d(α+1)(2β+d)2
(2β+d)(β+d)(β+d−1) ∀β ∈ [β, 1]. (5.1)
The ABSE policy from Perchet and Rigollet (2013) relies on the knowledge of β, and achieves the
rate-optimal regret of order T ζ(β,α,d) for any problem instance with 0 < β ≤ 1. The SACB policy resulting
from deploying ABSE as an input policy when βˆSACB ≤ 1 is smoothness-adaptive in the regime of smooth
non-differentiable payoff functions with the adaptation penalty (log T )
3d(α+1)(2β+d)2
(2β+d)(β+d)(β+d−1) .
5.1.2 Rate-optimality with at least Lipschitz-smooth payoffs
When the estimated smoothness in the SACB policy is larger than 1, that is, βˆSACB > 1, one may deploy
the SmoothBandit policy from Hu et al. (2019) as the non-adaptive input policy pi0. The SmoothBandit
policy relies on the following additional assumption on the regularity of decision regions.
Assumption 5 (Regularity). Let Qk :=
{
x ∈ [0, 1]d : (−1)k−1(f1(x)− f2(x)) ≥ 0
}
, k ∈ K, be the opti-
mal decision regions. Then, each Qk, is a non-empty (c0, r0)-regular set, where a Lebesgue measurable
set S is said to be (c0, r0)-regular if for all x ∈ S, λ [S ∩ Ball2(x, r)] ≥ c0λ [Ball2(x, r)] , where Ball2(x, r)
is the Euclidean ball of radius r centered around x and λ[·] denotes the Lebesgue measure.
Under Assumption 5, the resulting SACB policy guaranties rate-optimal performance without prior
information on the smoothness. This is formalized by the following Corollary.
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Corollary 5.4 (Rate optimality with at least Lipschitz-smooth payoffs). Consider the setting in Theorem
5.2, and suppose pi0(β0) = SmoothBandit(max(1, β0)) for β0 ≥ 1 then, if the decision regions associated
with P satisfy the regularity condition in Assumption 5 one has,
Rpi(P;T ) ≤ C¯T ζ(β,α,d) (log T )
3d(α+1)(2β+d)2
(2β+d)(β+d)(β+d−1)+
2β+d
2β ∀β ∈ [1, β¯]. (5.2)
The SmoothBandit policy relies on the knowledge of β and achieves the near-optimal regret of or-
der O
(
(log T )
2β+d
2β T ζ(β,α,d)
)
for any problem instance with β ≥ 1. The SACB policy, when paired
with SmoothBandit as its non-adaptive input policy, guarantees near-optimality without prior knowl-
edge of the smoothness in the regime of differentiable payoff functions, incurring the adaptation
penalty (log T )
3d(α+1)(2β+d)2
(2β+d)(β+d)(β+d−1) .
We note that the upper and lower bounds established in this regime with prior knowledge of the
smoothness are separated by a factor (log T )
2β+d
2β which is exponential in d. If the upper bound of Hu
et al. (2019) is indeed optimal in the sense that the above factor cannot be removed then, Corollary 5.4
establishes that the resulting SACB policy is smoothness-adaptive in the sense of Definition 2.4. Otherwise,
if another non-adaptive policy could be shown to eliminate the above factor and achieve the lower bound
of order Ω
(
T ζ(β,α,d)
)
then, it could be deployed to construct a smoothness-adaptive SACB policy.
We conclude this subsection by noting that Corollaries 5.3 and 5.4 demonstrate that through the
SACB policy one could achieve rate-optimality without prior knowledge of the smoothness parameter β
in each of the two smoothness regimes that have been studied in the literature; that is β ≤ 1 in, e.g.,
Perchet and Rigollet (2013), and β ≥ 1 in Hu et al. (2019). However, it is important to note that the
SACB policy does not require prior knowledge of the regime in which the smoothness parameter lies in
order to achieve rate-optimality. This is formalized by the following remark.
Remark 1 (Rate optimality with general smoothness). Consider the setting in Theorem 5.2, and
suppose pi0(β0) = ABSE(β0) for β0 ≤ 1 and pi0(β0) = SmoothBandit(β0) for β0 > 1. Then, for β ≤ 1 one
recovers the same regret bound as in (5.1), and for β > 1, under Assumption 5, one recovers the same
regret bound as in (5.2).
5.2 The SACB policy
The Smoothness-Adaptive Contextual Bandits (SACB) policy adaptively integrates a smoothness estimation
sub-routine with a non-adaptive off-the-self policy that is rate optimal under prior knowledge of the
smoothness. The smoothness estimation sub-routine consists of three consecutive steps: (i) collecting
samples in different regions of the covariate space; (ii) estimating the payoff functions; and (iii) examining
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a hypothesis test over the estimated functions. The policy repeats these steps until the smoothness
estimation sub-routine is terminated. Afterwards, the smoothness of the payoff functions is estimated
based on the results of the hypothesis tests.
After the estimation sub-routine is terminated, the estimate βˆSACB is used as an input to a non-adaptive
off-the-shelf policy that is designed to perform well under accurate tuning of the smoothness. We next
formalize the SACB policy, and then discuss the estimation subroutine in §5.2.1.
Algorithm 1: Smoothness-Adaptive Contextual Bandits (SACB)
1 Input: Set of non-adaptive policies {pi0(β0)}β0∈[β,β¯], horizon length T , minimum and maximum
smoothness exponents β and β¯, and a tuning parameter γ
2 Initialize: l←
⌈
(β+d−1) log2 T
(2β+d)2
⌉
and ξ(B) ← 0, N (B)k ← 0 for all B ∈ Bl and k ∈ K
3 for t = 1, . . . do
4 Determine the bin in which the current covariate is located: B ∈ Bl s.t. Xt ∈ B
5 Alternate between the arms: pit ← 1 + 1
{
N
(B)
1 > N
(B)
2
}
6 Update the counters: N
(B)
k ← N (B)k + 1 {pit = k} ∀k ∈ K
7 if N
(B)
1 +N
(B)
2 ≥ 2× 2r
(B)
and r(B) ≤ r¯ then
8 if ξ(B) = 0 and supk∈K,x∈M(B)
∣∣∣fˆ (B,r(B))k (x; j(B)1 )− fˆ (B,r(B))k (x; j(B)2 )∣∣∣ > γ(log T ) d2β+122r(B)/2 ; /* see (5.4)
*/
9 then
10 Record r
(B)
last: r
(B)
last ← r(B); Raise the flag: ξ(B) ← 1
11 Collect double number of samples in the next round: r(B) ← r(B) + 1; Reset the counters:
N
(B)
k ← 0 ∀k ∈ K
12 if [ ξ(B
′) = 1 or r(B
′) > r¯ ] for all B′ ∈ Bl then
13 Record TSACB : TSACB ← t
14 break
15 Estimate the smoothness: βˆSACB ← 12l
[
minB∈Bl r
(B)
last − ( 2dβ + 4) log2 log T
]
16 Choose the corresponding non-adaptive policy pi0 ← pi0(min[max[β, βˆSACB], β¯])
17 for t = TSACB + 1, . . . , T do
18 pit ← pi0 (Xt)
5.2.1 Smoothness estimation under the SACB policy
Sampling. In the SACB policy, we consider the partition of the unit cube corresponding to Bl with
l =
⌈
(β+d−1) log2 T
(2β+d)2
⌉
. For each bin (hypercube) B ∈ Bl, we collect samples for both actions in multiple
rounds. Define the maximum round index as follows: r¯ := d2lβ¯ + (2dβ + 4) log2 log T e. At every
round r ∈ {1, . . . , r¯}, we collect 2r samples for each action by alternating between them every time the
context belongs to B. If for some B ∈ Bl we reach r¯ before the smoothness estimation sub-routine is
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terminated, we continue alternating between the arms every time the context belongs B. We denote by
TSACB the time step at which the smoothness estimation sub-routine is terminated.
Estimation. We briefly review the local polynomial regression method based on the analysis in Audibert
and Tsybakov (2007); further analysis can be found in Appendix C. Let D = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1 be a set of n
i.i.d. pairs (Xi, Yi) ∈ X × R, distributed according to a joint distribution P . Denote by µ the marginal
density of Xi’s and define the regression function η(x) := E [Y |X = x]. To estimate the value of the
function η at any point x ∈ X , the local polynomial regression method is defined as follows.
Definition 5.5 (Local polynomial regression). Fix a set of pairs D = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1,a point x ∈ Rd, a
bandwidth h > 0, an integer p > 0 and the kernel function K(·) = 1 {‖·‖∞≤ 1}. Define by θˆx(u;D, h, p) =∑
|s|≤p ξsu
s a polynomial of degree p on Rd that minimizes
n∑
i=1
(
Yi − θˆx(Xi − x;D, h, p)
)2
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
. (5.3)
The local polynomial estimator ηˆLP(x;D, h, p) of the value η(x) of the regression function f(·) at point x
is defined by: ηˆLP(x;D, h, p) := θˆx(0;D, h, p) if (5.3) has a unique minimizer, and ηˆLP(x;D, h, p) := 0
otherwise.
Denote by X
(B,r)
k,1 , X
(B,r)
k,2 , . . . and Y
(B,r)
k,1 , Y
(B,r)
k,2 , . . . the successive covariates and outcomes when action
k is selected in B at round r, respectively. Denote by D(B,r)k :=
{(
X
(B,r)
k,τ , Y
(B,r)
k,τ
)}2r
τ=1
the corresponding
set of pairs. Define the two bandwidth exponents: j
(B)
1 := l, and j
(B)
2 := l + d 1β log2 log T e. Let
l˜ := d
¯
βl
β +
log2 log T
β e ∨ d(1 + β¯)l + log2 log T e. For every bin B define the mesh points:
M(B) :=
{
x =
(
m1
2l˜
, . . . ,
md
2l˜
)
: x ∈ B,mi ∈ {1, . . . , 2l˜} for i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
}
.
For every mesh point x ∈ M(B), we form two separate estimates of the payoff functions using local
polynomial regression of degree bβ¯c:
fˆ
(B,r)
k (x; j) := ηˆ
LP(x;D(B,r)k , 2−j , bβ¯c), j ∈ {j(B)1 , j(B)2 }. (5.4)
Hypothesis test. At the end of each sampling round r in bin B, we check whether the difference
between the estimation using the two bandwidths exponents j
(B)
1 and j
(B)
2 exceeds a pre-determined
threshold. Formally, for a tuning parameter γ, we check whether the following holds:
(5.5)sup
k ∈K,x∈M(B)
∣∣∣fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)1 )− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)2 )∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
2r/2
,
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The left hand side of (5.5) is driven by two terms: the estimation bias of fˆ
(B,r)
k (x; j
(B)
1 ), which is
potentially larger due to a larger bandwidth; and the standard deviation of fˆ
(B,r)
k (x; j
(B)
2 ), which is
potentially larger since, on average, it is based on less samples. The right hand side of (5.5), however, is
proportional to the standard deviation of the estimate fˆ
(B,r)
k (x; j
(B)
2 ). That is, by examining (5.5), we
are detecting the number of samples that is required for the estimation bias of fˆ
(B,r)
k (x; j
(B)
1 ) to dominate
the standard deviation of fˆ
(B,r)
k (x; j
(B)
2 ), which, as we will see, is dependent on the smoothness of the
payoff functions. This dependence allows one to infer the smoothness of payoff functions with a good
precision with high probability. Denote by r
(B)
last the smallest round index for which (5.5) holds in bin B
(upon this event, we set the flag ξ(B) = 1). If (5.5) never holds in B, we simply set r
(B)
last = r¯.
The quantity r
(B)
last closely relates to the smoothness of the payoff functions. In what follows, we
show that minB∈Bl r
(B)
last ≈ 2lβ with high probability; this relation stems from 2r
(B)
last essentially being the
minimal number of samples required for the bias and standard deviation to be balanced for hypercube B
under our procedure (in the sense of equation 5.5).
We next develop high-probability bounds for r
(B)
last; following the above connection, these bounds are
used for establishing the smoothness estimate in (5.6), as well as Theorem 5.1. The next proposition
provides a high-probability lower bound for r
(B)
last for all the bins B ∈ Bl.
Proposition 5.6 (High-probability lower bound for r
(B)
last). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds for some
L > 0 and β ∈ [β, β¯]. Then, there exist constants Cr, C7, C8, and C9 such that for all T ≥ 1,
r
(B)
last < Cr + 2lβ +
(
d
β
+ 1
)
log2 log T
for some B ∈ Bl, with probability less than C7 (log T )
d
β T−γ2C8+C9 , where the constants C7, C8, and C9
depend only on β, β¯, L, ρ, ρ¯, and d, and Cr depends only β, β¯, L, ρ, and ρ¯.
The proof of Proposition 5.6 is based on the discussion provided after (5.5). Since the payoff functions
belong to H(β, L), their estimation bias is bounded in each bin B ∈ Bl. This implies that when the
number of samples is “small”, the left hand side of (5.5) is dominated by the standard deviation of
fˆ
(B,r)
k (x; j
(B)
2 ), which is proportional to the right hand side of (5.5), with high probability. The next
result complements Proposition 5.6 by providing a high-probability upper bound for minB∈Bl r
(B)
last.
Proposition 5.7 (High-probability upper bound for minB∈Bl r
(B)
last). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds
for some L > 0 and β ∈ [β, β¯], and that Assumption 4 holds for some b > 0 and l0 ≥ 0 then, there exist
some B ∈ Bl and some constants Cr, C10, and C11 such that for all T ≥ 1,
r
(B)
last > Cr + 2lβ +
(
d
β
+ 3
)
log2 log T
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with probability less than C10T
−γ2C11 , where the constants C10 and C11 depend only on β, β¯, L, b, ρ, ρ¯,
and d, and Cr depends only on β, β¯, L, b, ρ, and ρ¯.
The proof of Proposition 5.7 is again based on the discussion provided after (5.5). Since the set of payoff
functions is self-similar, the estimation bias of the estimate fˆ
(B,r)
k (x; j
(B)
1 ) remains “large” in at least
one of the bins B ∈ Bl and for one of the arms, which implies that for that specific bin and arm, if the
number of samples is “large” enough then, the left hand side of (5.5) is dominated by the aforementioned
bias and eventually exceed the right hand side of (5.5) with high probability.
Based on Proposition 5.6 and 5.7, we estimate the smoothness of the problem as follows:
βˆSACB =
1
2l
[
min
B∈Bl
r
(B)
last −
(
2d
β
+ 4
)
log2 log T
]
. (5.6)
Note that in order to avoid costly estimation errors this estimate is designed to be less than β with
high probability, which is commonly referred to as “undersmoothing” in the construction of confidence
intervals; see, e.g., Bickel and Rosenblatt (1973), Hall (1992), Picard and Tribouley (2000), and Gine´
and Nickl (2010).
We conclude this section with a discussion on the low sample complexity of our smoothness estimation
sub-routine relative to the optimal regret rates. In order to achieve rate-optimality one is required to
estimate the smoothness β with precision of order 1log T . Broadly speaking, our proposed estimation
sub-routine (i) collects n independent samples from payoff functions that are Holder-smooth and self
similar; (ii) partitions the unit cube to hypercubes of side-length h; and (iii) estimates the payoff
functions in each hypercube using local polynomial regression. The resulting estimation bias is of
order hβ. However, using our proposed sub-routine, one may evaluate the estimation bias as chβ for
some finite c. This results in an estimate of β of the form log(ch
β)
log h = β+
c
log h . Hence, to achieve precision
of order 1log T , it suffices to have h = T
p for some p. In order for the estimation sub-routine to perform
well, one requires the estimation bias (≈ hβ) and the estimation standard deviation (≈ 1√
nhd
) to be
balanced, that is, n should be of order T q for some q. Finally, one can make q arbitrarily small such
that n is not large relative to the optimal regret rate.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we studied the problem of adapting to unknown smoothness of payoff functions in a
non-parametric contextual MAB setting. First, we showed that, in general, it is impossible to achieve
rate-optimal performance simultaneously over different classes of payoff functions in the following sense:
There exist some pairs of smoothness parameters (γ, β) such that no policy can simultaneously attain
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optimal regret rates over the problems P(γ, α, d) and P(β, α, d). This implies that, in general, one might
incur non-trivial adaptation cost when the smoothness of payoffs is a priori unknown.
We overcome the impossibility of adaptation by leveraging a self-similarity condition (which does not
reduce the minimax complexity of the problem). We devised a general policy based on: (i) inferring the
smoothness of the payoff functions using observations that are collected throughout the decision-making
process; and (ii) using effective non-adaptive policies as off-the-shelf input polices. We showed that
this approach allows one to guarantee the best regret rate that is achievable given the underlying
smoothness exponent β that characterizes the problem instance, without requiring prior knowledge
of that smoothness. Our policy is smoothness-adaptive, in the sense of achieving that rate up to a
multiplicative term that is poly-logarithmic in the horizon length and a multiplicative constant that may
depend on other problem parameters.
Avenues for future research. Our study presents several new research directions. One open question
is whether our impossibility statement holds for any pair of Ho¨lder exponents (γ, β). More precisely, it is
left to understand whether there is any policy that can achieve rate optimal performance simultaneously
over two different problem instances characterized by different smoothness parameters, without additional
assumptions such as the one of self-similarity. If not, it would be desirable to extend our analysis to
establish impossibility of adaptation for any pair of Ho¨lder exponents (γ, β).
Another path is to study how tight the lower bound provided in Theorem 3.1 is. In other words, for
pairs of smoothness parameters (γ, β) over which impossibility of adaptation is established, can one
design a MAB policy that achieves rate-optimal performance over problem instances characterized by γ,
and incurs the regret rate provided in Theorem 3.1 for problem instances characterized by β?
Another interesting question is whether there exists any assumption weaker than that of self-similarity
that allows for designing smoothness-adaptive policies. If not, a natural direction would be to study the
adaptation cost that one has to incur with respect to the self-similarity constant b in Definition 4.1.
7 Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3.1
In this section, we describe the proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3.1. The proof follows the next steps. In
Step 1, we discuss some notations and definitions including the definition of inferior sampling rate. In
Step 2, we leverage a result from Rigollet and Zeevi (2010) to connect regret and inferior sampling rate,
which enables one to simplify analysis by focusing on the inferior sampling rate throughout the proof.
In Step 3, which is a key step of the proof, we reduce the problem at hand to a hypothesis testing
problem by introducing a novel construction of a set of problem instances. This set consists of a nominal
problem instance with smoothness parameter γ and some other problem instances with smoothness
24
parameter β, each of which differs from the nominal one only over a specific region of the covariate
space. These problem instances are designed to connect between the amount of exploration and the
ability to identify the correct smoothness parameter. This construction is designed for showing that if a
policy achieves rate-optimal performance over smooth problems, it is likely to under-explore in “rougher”
problems, and hence, not being able to differentiate between the two.
In Step 4, we verify that the aforementioned problem instances satisfy the margin condition. In Step 5,
we show that with high probability, the number of contexts that belong to the regions mentioned in
Step 3 grow linearly with respect to the time horizon and the volume of the regions. In Steps 6 and 7,
we show that since the policy is rate optimal for γ-smooth problems, it cannot distinguish between the
nominal problem and at least one of the β-smooth problems. In Step 8, we lower bound the inferior
sampling rate due to not being able to identify the correct smoothness parameter.5 In Step 9, we revert
back the lower bound on inferior sampling rate to a lower bound on regret.
Step 1 (Preliminaries). For any policy pi and decision horizon T , let Spi(P;T ) be the inferior
sampling rate defined as
Spi(P;T ) := Epi
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
fpi∗t (Xt) 6= fpit(Xt)
}]
. (7.1)
Fix a covariate distribution PX . For any policy pi and function f : [0, 1]
d → [0, 1], denote by Spi(f ;T )
the inferior sampling rate of pi when PX is the covariate distribution, E [Y1,t | Xt] = f(Xt), and
E [Y2,t | Xt] = 12 . Notably, the oracle policy pi∗f is given by pi∗f (x) = 2− 1
{
f(x) ≥ 12
}
. We further denote
by Ppi,f and Epi,f the corresponding probability and expectation. Finally, for any Ho¨lder exponent β > 0
and margin parameter α > 0, define:
Rpiβ,α(T ) := sup
P∈P(β,α,d)
Rpi(P;T ); Spiβ,α(T ) := sup
P∈P(β,α,d)
Spi(P;T ).
Fix T ≥ 1, two Ho¨lder exponents 0 < β < γ ≤ 1, a margin parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1γ , a positive Lipschitz
constant L, and positive constants ρ, ρ¯ such that PX satisfies Assumption 2 with parameters ρ, ρ¯.
Step 2 (From regret to inferior sampling rate). The following lemma implies that it suffices to
first analyze inferior sampling rate and then, revert the result back to regret.
Lemma 7.1 (Rigollet and Zeevi 2010, Lemma 3.1). For any α > 0 under the margin condition in
Assumption 3, one has
Spi(P;T ) ≤ CsrT
1
α+1 [Rpi(P;T )] αα+1 ,
for any policy pi and some positive constant Csr.
5Some high-level ideas in Steps 7 and 8 are adopted from the proof of Theorem 3 in Locatelli and Carpentier (2018).
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By Lemma 7.1, we have Spiβ,α(T ) ≤ CsrT
1
α+1
[
Rpiβ,α(T )
] α
α+1
. Note that when pi is rate-optimal over
P(γ, α, d), Lemma 7.1 implies that for some constants Cr, Cs > 0, one has:
Rpiγ,α(T ) ≤ CrT 1−
γ(1+α)
2β+d =: R∗γ,α(T ); Spiγ,α(T ) ≤ CsT 1−
γα
2γ+d =: S∗γ,α(T ).
Step 3 (Constructing problem instances). In this step we reduce our problem to a hypothesis
testing problem. In order to do so, we first construct some problem instances. Defining M := d∆α− dβ e
and Cφ :=
L
22+2β
, fix the parameter ∆ > 0 such that
64C2φ∆
2S∗γ,α(T )
3M
=
1
2
.
This selection of ∆ implies that for large enough T one has Cφ∆ ≤ 14 . For any 0 < κ ≤ 1, define the
functions ψ˜κ and ψˆκ as follows:
ψ˜κ(x) :=
|1− ‖x‖∞|
κ if 0 ≤ ‖x‖∞≤ 1;
0 o.w.;
ψˆκ(x) :=

|1− ‖x‖∞|κ if 0 ≤ ‖x‖∞≤ 1;
− |‖x‖∞−1|κ if 1 ≤ ‖x‖∞≤ 2;
−1 o.w.
Note that ψ˜κ ∈ HRd(κ, 1) and ψˆκ ∈ HRd(κ, 2). The following two lemmas (proved in Appendix E) are
the main tools to analyze the smoothness of the payoff functions that we construct in this step.
Lemma 7.2 (Scaling and smoothness). Suppose f ∈ HRd(β, L) for some 0 < β ≤ 1 and L > 0, and
define the function g such that g(x) = C−βf(Cx) for all x ∈ Rd and some C > 0. Then, g ∈ HRd(β, L).
Lemma 7.3 (Min/Max and smoothness). Suppose f, g ∈ HX (β, L) for some X ⊆ Rd, 0 < β ≤ 1 and
L > 0, and define the functions h1 := max(f, g) and h2 := min(f, g). Then, h1, h2 ∈ HX (β, L).
Define a hypercube H0 := [0, 2∆
α
d ]d with a center q0 := (∆
α
d ,∆
α
d , . . . ,∆
α
d ) ∈ Rd. Define the function
φ0(x) :=
1
2
− Cφ ·min
{
∆,∆
αγ
d · ψ˜γ
(
∆−
α
d [x− q0]
)}
.
By Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3, φ0 ∈ H(γ, L) since Cφ ≤ L. Consider the grid G that partitions the hypercube
H0 into M disjoint hypercubes (Hm)m∈{1,...,M}. Let qm ∈ Rd,m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, be the center of the
hypercube Hm. Let H˜m be the hypercube of side-length l :=
∆
α
d
2M
1
d
centered around qm. Note that
H˜m ⊂ Hm and that the side-length of Hm is 2l. Define the functions φm,m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, as follows:
φm(x) := max
{
φ0(x),
1
2
+ Cφ ·∆ · ψˆβ
(
2l−1[x− qm]
)}
.
Since Cφ =
L
22+2β
and ∆ ≤ 2β+1lβ for large enough T , by Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3 one has that φm ∈ H(β, L)
for 1 ≤ m ≤M .
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Step 4 (Verifying the margin condition). By examining different cases of parametric values, we
verify that the margin condition is satisfied with parameters α and C0 := 2
d3dρC−αφ when f1 = φm and
f2 =
1
2 for all 0 ≤ m ≤M . For space considerations, we defer the analysis of this step to Appendix A.1.
Step 5 (Desirable event). For m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, define Qm :=
∑T
t=1 1
{
Xt ∈ H˜m
}
=:
∑T
t=1 Zm,t to
be the number of times periods at which the realized contexts belong to the hypercube H˜m. Define
A := {∃m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} : Qm < ρT ld} to be the event where Qm is less than ρT ld for at least one value
of m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Note that
P {A} ≤
M∑
m=1
P
{
Qm < ρT l
d
}
.
In order to bound each of the summands on the right hand side of the above inequality, one may apply
Bernstein’s inequality in the following lemma 7.4 to Qm:
Lemma 7.4 (Bernstein inequality). Let X1, . . . , Xn be random variables with range |Xi|≤ M and
n∑
t=1
Var [Xt |Xt−1, . . . , X1] = σ2. Let Sn = X1 + · · ·+Xn. Then for all a ≥ 0
P{Sn ≥ E[Sn] + a} ≤ exp
(
− a
2/2
σ2 +Ma/3
)
.
Note that since EZm,t ≥ 2ρld, |Zm,t|≤ 1, and VarZm,t ≤ EZ2m,t ≤ 2ρ¯ld, one obtains:
P {A} ≤M exp
(
−ρT ld/5
)
(a)
≤ c1[S∗γ,α]
αβ−d
2β+d−αβ exp
(
−c2T [S∗γ,α(T )]−
d
2β+d−αβ
)
≤ c1T
αβ−d
2β+d−αβ exp
(
−c3T
2β(2γ+d−αγ)+αd(γ−β)
(2γ+d)(2β+d−αβ)
)
(b)
≤ c4T−3,
for large enough T and constants c1, c2, c3, c4 > 0, where (a) follows from the definition of M and l,
and (b) holds by 2β(2γ+d−αγ)+αd(γ−β)(2γ+1)(2β+d−αβ) > 0 for α ≤ 1γ . For any problem instance P and horizon length T ,
denote the inferior sampling rate of pi when the event A does not occur by
S¯pi(P;T ) := Epi
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
fpi∗t (Xt) 6= fpit(Xt)
} ∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
]
.
Define S¯piγ,α(T ) := sup
P∈P(γ,α,d)
S¯pi(P;T ). Note that
(1− P {A}) S¯pi(P;T ) ≤ Spi(P;T ) ≤ S¯pi(P;T ) + TP {A} ,
which implies that ∣∣S¯piγ,α(T )− Spiγ,α(T )∣∣ ≤ c4T−2. (7.2)
For the rest of the proof, all probabilities and expectations will be computed conditional on A¯.
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Step 6 (Selecting a single problem with smoothness β). Let Nm,T :=
∑T
t=1 1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ Hm}
denote the number of times policy pi selects arm 1 when realized covariates belong to the hypercube Hm.
By definition, ETpi,φ0
[∑M
m=1Nm,T
∣∣∣ A¯ ] ≤ S¯piγ,α(T ), implying that there exists some m∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
such that
ETpi,φ0
[
Nm∗,T
∣∣ A¯ ] ≤ S¯piγ,α(T )
M
≤ S
pi
γ,α(T )
M
+ c4T
−2,
where the last inequality holds by (7.2).
Step 7 (Likelihood of distinguishing between different smoothness parameters). We show
that policy pi cannot distinguish between φ0 and φm∗ with a strictly positive probability. For any
set of samples {(pit, Xt, Ypit,t)}Tt=1, define the log-likelihood ratio Lm,T = Lm,T
(
{(pit, Xt, Ypit,t)}Tt=1
)
for m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} as:
Lm,T :=
T∑
t=1
log
(
Ppi,φ0 {Ypit,t | pit, Xt}
Ppi,φm {Ypit,t | pit, Xt}
)
≤
T∑
t=1
1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ Hm} ·
[
Ypit,t log
(
φ0(Xt)
φm(Xt)
)
+ (1− Ypit,t) log
(
(1− φ0(Xt))
(1− φm(Xt))
)]
≤
T∑
t=1
1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ Hm} ·
[
Ypit,t
(φ0(Xt)− φm(Xt))
φm(Xt)
+ (1− Ypit,t)
(φm(Xt)− φ0(Xt))
(1− φm(Xt))
]
=
T∑
t=1
1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ Hm} · (Ypit,t − φm(Xt))(φ0(Xt)− φm(Xt))
φm(Xt)(1− φm(Xt)) ,
where the last inequality follows from log(1 + x) ≤ x for all x > 0. By taking expectations of the above
inequality and conditioning on the event A¯ for m = m∗, one obtains:
Epi,φ0
[
Lm∗,T
∣∣ A¯ ] ≤ Epi,φ0
[
T∑
t=1
1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ Hm∗} · (Ypit,t − φm
∗(Xt))(φ0(Xt)− φm∗(Xt))
φm∗(Xt)(1− φm∗(Xt))
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
]
= Epi,φ0
[
T∑
t=1
E
[
1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ Hm∗} · (Ypit,t − φm
∗(Xt))(φ0(Xt)− φm∗(Xt))
φm∗(Xt)(1− φm∗(Xt))
∣∣∣∣ Xt]
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
]
= Epi,φ0
[
T∑
t=1
1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ Hm∗} · (φ0(Xt)− φm
∗(Xt))
2
φm∗(Xt)(1− φm∗(Xt))
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
]
(a)
≤ 64C
2
φ∆
2
3
Epi,φ0
[
T∑
t=1
1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ Hm∗}
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
]
=
64C2φ∆
2
3
Epi,φ0
[
Nm∗,T
∣∣ A¯ ] (b)≤ 64C2φ∆2S∗γ,α(T )
3M
+ c4T
−2 (c)≤ 1, (7.3)
for large enough T , where: (a) follows from Cφ∆ ≤ 14 ; (b) follows from the definition of m∗; and (c)
holds by the definition of ∆.
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Step 8 (Lower bound on inferior sampling). Let N˜m,T :=
∑T
t=1 1
{
pit = 1, Xt ∈ H˜m
}
denote the
number of times policy pi selects arm 1 when realized covariates belong to the hypercube H˜m. We
next use two lemmas in order to show that with a strictly positive probability one has N˜m∗,T <
ρT ld
2
conditional on the event A¯ under problem m∗, implying that pi selects an inferior arm at least ρT l
d
2 times.
The first lemma is a simple variation of Lemma 2.6 in Tsybakov (2008) and is proved for completeness in
Appendix E; the second lemma is a straightforward extension of Lemma 19 in Kaufmann et al. (2016).
Lemma 7.5 (Hypothesis testing error probability). Let ρ0, ρ1 be two probability distributions supported
on X , with ρ0 absolutely continuous with respect to ρ1. Then, for any measurable function Ψ : X → {0, 1}:
Pρ0{Ψ(X) = 1}+ Pρ1{Ψ(X) = 0} ≥
1
2
exp(−KL(ρ0, ρ1)).
Lemma 7.6 (Log-likelihood ratio and historical events). For any event
E ∈ F−t = σ (pi1, X1, Ypi1,1, . . . , piT , XT , YpiT ,T ) and an arbitrary event A, one has
Epi,φ0 [Lm,T | E ,A] ≥ log
(
Ppi,φ0 {E | A}
Ppi,φm {E | A}
)
.
Denote by ρ0 and ρm the distributions of N˜m,T under the problems 0 and m conditional on the event A¯.
Define the test function Ψ(x) = 1
{
x ≥ ρT l
d
2
}
. With this selection of ρ0, ρm, and Ψ, Lemma 7.5 yields:
Ppi,φ0
{
N˜m∗,T ≥
ρT ld
2
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
}
+ Ppi,φm∗
{
N˜m∗,T <
ρT ld
2
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
}
≥ 1
2
exp(−KL(ρ0, ρm∗)).
To establish a lower bound on the right hand side of the above inequality, we note that:
Epi,φ0
[
Lm∗,T
∣∣ A¯ ] = T∑
s=1
Epi,φ0
[
Lm∗,T
∣∣∣ A¯, N˜m∗,T = s]Ppi,φ0 {N˜m∗,T = s ∣∣∣ A¯ }
≥
T∑
s=1
log
 Ppi,φ0
{
N˜m∗,T = s
∣∣∣ A¯ }
Ppi,φm∗
{
N˜m∗,T = s
∣∣∣ A¯ }
Ppi,φ0 {N˜m∗,T = s ∣∣∣ A¯ } = KL(ρ0, ρm∗),
where the inequality follows from Lemma 7.6. The last two inequalities, along with (7.3), yield
Ppi,φ0
{
N˜m∗,T ≥
ρT ld
2
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
}
+ Ppi,φm∗
{
N˜m∗,T <
ρT ld
2
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
}
≥ 1
2
exp(−1).
Next, we show that Ppi,φ0
{
N˜m∗,T ≥ ρT l
d
2
∣∣∣∣ A¯ } is small. We apply Markov’s inequality to obtain:
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Ppi,φ0
{
N˜m∗,T ≥
ρT ld
2
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
}
≤
Epi,φ0
[
N˜m∗,T
∣∣∣ A¯ ]
ρT ld
2
(a)
≤
S∗γ,α(T )
M + c4T
−2
ρT ld
2
(b)
≤ 2
d[S∗γ,α]1+
αβ
2β+d−αβ + c4l
−dT−2
ρT
2
≤ c5T
αd(β−γ)
(2β+d−αβ)(2γ+d)
(c)
≤ 1
4
exp(−1),
for large enough T and some constant c5 > 0, where: (a) follows from the definition of m
∗ and (7.2);
(b) holds due to the definition of l and M ; and (c) holds due to the fact that αd(β−γ)(2β+d−αβ)(2γ+d) < 0 since
α ≤ 1γ . The last two displays yield that for large enough T , one has Ppi,φm∗
{
N˜m∗,T <
ρT ld
2
∣∣∣∣ A¯ } ≥ 14e .
By definition, when event A¯ holds, at least ρT ld times realized contexts belong to the hypercube H˜m,
that is, for some constant c6 > 0, one has:
S¯pi(T ;φm∗) ≥
ρT ld
2
Ppi,φm∗
{
N˜m∗,T <
ρT ld
2
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
}
≥ ρT l
d
8e
≥ c6T
[S∗γ,α(T )]− d2β+d−αβ . (7.4)
Step 9 (From inferior sampling rate to regret). Note that Spiβ,α(T ) ≥ S¯pi(φm∗ ;T ). That is, by
putting together (7.4), (7.2), and Lemma 7.1, one obtains
Rpiβ,α(T ) ≥ CT 1−
d
α(2β+d−αβ)
[R∗γ,α(T )]− d2β+d−αβ ,
for some constant C > 0. This concludes the proof. 
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A Proofs of main results
A.1 Verifying the margin condition in Step 4 of the proof of Theorem 3.1.
• For m = 0 and δ ≤ Cφ∆, one has
PX
{
0 < |φ0(X)− 1
2
|≤ δ
}
≤ ρ¯
∫
H0
1
{
Cφ∆
αγ
d · ψ˜γ
(
∆−
α
d [x− q0]
)
≤ δ
}
dx
≤ 2dρ¯∆α
∫
[0,1]d
1
{
ψ˜γ (x) ≤ δC−1φ ∆−
αγ
d
}
dx
≤ 2dρ¯∆α
[
1−
∫
[0,1]d
1
{
‖x‖∞≤ 1− δ
1
γC
− 1
γ
φ ∆
−α
d
}
dx
]
≤ 2dρ¯∆α
[
1−
(
1− δ 1γC−
1
γ
φ ∆
−α
d
)d]
≤ 2dρ¯∆α
[
dδ
1
γC
− 1
γ
φ ∆
−α
d
]
(a)
≤ 2ddρ¯C−αφ ∆
1
γ
−α
d δα ≤ 2ddρ¯C−αφ δα, (A.1)
where (a) holds since α ≤ 1γ .
• For m = 0 and δ > Cφ∆, one has
PX
{
0 < |φ0(X)− 1
2
|≤ δ
}
≤ 2dρ¯∆α ≤ 2dρ¯C−αφ δα.
• For 1 ≤ m ≤M and δ ≤ Cφ∆, one has
PX
{
0 < |φm(X)− 1
2
|≤ δ
}
≤ PX
{
0 < Cφ ·∆ ·
∣∣1− 2l−1‖x− qm‖∞∣∣β ≤ δ, X ∈ H˜m}
+ PX
{
0 < Cφ ·∆ ·
∣∣2l−1‖x− qm‖∞−1∣∣β ≤ δ,X ∈ Hm \ H˜m}
+ PX
{
0 < |φ0(X)− 1
2
|≤ δ
}
. (A.2)
Next, we analyze each term separately. One has
PX
{
0 < Cφ ·∆ ·
∣∣1− 2l−1‖x− qm‖∞∣∣β ≤ δ, X ∈ H˜m}
≤ ρ¯
∫
H˜m
1
{
Cφ ·∆ ·
∣∣1− 2l−1‖x− qm‖∞∣∣β ≤ δ} dx
≤ ρ¯
∫
H˜m
1
{
‖x− qm‖∞≥ l
2
(
1− C−
1
β
φ ∆
− 1
β δ
1
β
)}
dx
= ρ¯2−dld
[
1−
(
1− C−
1
β
φ ∆
− 1
β δ
1
β
)d]
(a)
≤ ρ¯2−dld
[
dδ
1
βC
− 1
β
φ ∆
− 1
β
]
(b)
≤ dρ¯2−2dC−αφ δα, (A.3)
33
where (a) follows from the inequality (1 − x)r ≥ 1 − rx for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, r ≥ 1, and (b) holds by
α ≤ 1γ . Similarly,
PX
{
0 < Cφ∆
∣∣2l−1‖x− qm‖∞−1∣∣β ≤ δ,X ∈ Hm \ H˜m}
≤ ρ¯
∫
Hm\H˜m
1
{
Cφ∆
∣∣2l−1‖x− qm‖∞−1∣∣β ≤ δ} dx
≤ ρ¯
∫
Hm\H˜m
1
{
‖x− qm‖∞≤ l
2
(
1 + C
− 1
β
φ ∆
− 1
β δ
1
β
)}
dx
= ρ¯2−dld
[(
1 + C
− 1
β
φ ∆
− 1
β δ
1
β
)d
− 1
]
(a)
≤ ρ¯ldC−
1
β
φ ∆
− 1
β δ
1
β
(b)
≤ ρ¯C−αφ δα, (A.4)
where (a) follows from the inequality (1 + x)r ≤ 2rx + 1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, r ≥ 1, and (b) holds by
α ≤ 1γ . Putting together (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4), yields for δ ≤ Cφ∆:
PX
{
0 < |φm(X)− 1
2
|≤ δ
}
≤ C0δα.
• The case 1 ≤ m ≤M and δ > Cφ∆ can be analyzed similar to the case m = 0 and δ > Cφ∆.
A.2 Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 3.1
The proof follows similar lines of argument as in the proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3.1.
Step 1 (Preliminaries). Fix time horizon length T ≥ 1, and some Ho¨lder exponent γ > 1, some
margin parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, some positive Lipschitz constants L, and some positive constants ρ, ρ¯ such
that PX , the covariate distribution, satisfies Assumption 2 with parameters ρ, ρ¯.
Step 2 (From regret to inferior sampling rate). By Lemma 7.1, we have Spiβ,α(T ) ≤ CsrT
1
α+1
[
Rpiβ,α(T )
] α
α+1
.
Note that by the assumption that pi is rate-optimal over P(γ, α, d) and Lemma 7.1, one has
Rpiγ,α(T ) ≤ CrT 1−
γ(1+α)
2β+d =: R∗γ,α(T ), Spiγ,α(T ) ≤ CsT 1−
γα
2γ+d =: S∗γ,α(T ),
for some constants Cr, Cs > 0.
Step 3 (Constructing problem instances). We will reduce our problem to a hypothesis testing
problem. To do so, we construct some problem instances first. Define the parameter ∆ > 0 such that
64C2φ∆
2S∗γ,α(T )
3
=
1
2
,
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where we define Cφ :=
L
22β
. Note that the definition of ∆ implies that for large enough T , one has
Cφ∆ ≤ 14 . Define the function:
φ0(x) :=
1
2
− Cφ · (1
2
− x1).
Note that φ0 ∈ H(γ, L) since Cφ ≤ L. Define the hypercube H := [12 −∆, 12 ]× [0, 1]d−1, with a center
q0 := (
1−∆
2 ,
1
2 , . . . ,
1
2) ∈ Rd, and the function:
φ1(x) := φ0(x) + 2Cφ ·∆ · ψ˜
(
2∆−1[x− q0]
)
.
For any 0 < κ ≤ 1, define the functions ψ˜:
ψ˜(x) :=
|1− |x1|| if |x1|≤ 10 o.w. .
Note that by Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3, φ0 ∈ H(1, L) since Cφ ≤ L22β .
Step 4 (Verifying the margin condition). We verify that the margin condition is satisfied with
parameters α and C0 :=
5ρ¯
2Cφ
when f1 = φm and f2 =
1
2 for all 0 ≤ m ≤ 1.
• For m = 0 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, one has
PX
{
0 < |φ0(X)− 1
2
|≤ δ
}
≤ 2ρ¯δ
Cφ
≤ 2ρ¯δ
α
Cφ
.
• For m = 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, one has
PX
{
0 < |φm(X)− 1
2
|≤ δ
}
≤ 5ρ¯δ
2Cφ
≤ 5ρ¯δ
α
2Cφ
.
Step 5 (Desirable event). Note that for x ∈ H˜ := [12 − 2∆3 , 12 ] × [0, 1]d−1, the first arm is optimal
under the problem m = 1. Define Q :=
∑T
t=1 1
{
Xt ∈ H˜
}
=:
∑T
t=1 Zt to be the number of times contexts
fall into the the hypercube H˜m during the entire time horizon. Define the event
A :=
{
Q <
2
3
ρT∆
}
to be the event on which the number of contexts that have fallen into the hypercube H˜ is less than
2
3ρT∆. In order to bound P {A}, one can apply Bernstein’s inequality in Lemma 7.4 to Q by noting
that EZt ≥ 23ρ∆, |Zt|≤ 1, and VarZt ≤ EZ2t ≤ 23ρ∆ to obtain
P {A} ≤ exp
(
−2
3
ρT∆/5
)
(a)
≤ exp
(
−c1T [S∗γ,α(T )]−
1
2
)
≤ exp
(
−c1T
(1+α2 )γ+
d
2
(2γ+d)
)
≤ c2T−3,
for large enough T and constants c1, c2 > 0, where (a) follows from the definition of ∆.
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For any problem instance P and time horizon T , denote by
S¯pi(P;T ) := Epi
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
fpi∗t (Xt) 6= fpit(Xt)
} ∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
]
the inferior sampling rate of pi when the event A fails, and let S¯piγ,α(T ) := sup
P∈P(γ,α,d)
S¯pi(P;T ). Note that
(1− P {A}) S¯pi(P;T ) ≤ Spi(P;T ) ≤ S¯pi(P;T ) + TP {A} ,
which implies ∣∣S¯piγ,α(T )− Spiγ,α(T )∣∣ ≤ c2T−2. (A.5)
For the rest of the proof probabilities and expectations will be computed conditional on the event A¯.
Step 6 (Likelihood of distinguishing different smoothness parameters). In this step, we will
show that policy pi cannot distinguish between φ0 and φ1 with a strictly positive probability. For any
set of samples {(pit, Xt, Ypit,t)}Tt=1, define the log-likelihood ratio LT = LT
(
{(pit, Xt, Ypit,t)}Tt=1
)
as:
LT :=
T∑
t=1
log
(
Ppi,φ0 {Ypit,t | pit, Xt}
Ppi,φ1 {Ypit,t | pit, Xt}
)
≤
T∑
t=1
1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ H} ·
[
Ypit,t log
(
φ0(Xt)
φ1(Xt)
)
+ (1− Ypit,t) log
(
(1− φ0(Xt))
(1− φ1(Xt))
)]
≤
T∑
t=1
1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ H} ·
[
Ypit,t
(φ0(Xt)− φ1(Xt))
φm(Xt)
+ (1− Ypit,t)
(φ1(Xt)− φ0(Xt))
(1− φ1(Xt))
]
=
T∑
t=1
1 {pit = 1, Xt ∈ H} · (Ypit,t − φ1(Xt))(φ0(Xt)− φ1(Xt))
φ1(Xt)(1− φ1(Xt)) ,
where the last inequality follows from log(1 + x) ≤ x for all x > 0. Taking expectation conditional on
the event A¯, one obtains:
Epi,φ0
[
LT
∣∣ A¯ ] ≤ Epi,φ0
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
pit = 1, Xt ∈ H˜
}
· (Ypit,t − φ1(Xt))(φ0(Xt)− φ1(Xt))
φ1(Xt)(1− φ1(Xt))
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
]
≤ Epi,φ0
[
T∑
t=1
E
[
1
{
pit = 1, Xt ∈ H˜1
}
· (Ypit,t − φ1(Xt))(φ0(Xt)− φ1(Xt))
φ1(Xt)(1− φ1(Xt))
∣∣∣∣ Xt]
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
]
= Epi,φ0
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
pit = 1, Xt ∈ H˜
}
· (φ0(Xt)− φ1(Xt))
2
φ1(Xt)(1− φ1(Xt))
∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
]
(a)
≤ 64C
2
φ∆
2
3
Epi,φ0
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
pit = 1, Xt ∈ H˜
} ∣∣∣∣∣ A¯
]
≤ 64C
2
φ∆
2S∗γ,α(T )
3
+ c2T
−2 (b)≤ 1, (A.6)
for large enough T , where (a) follows from Cφ∆ ≤ 14 , and (b) follows from the definition of ∆.
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Step 7 (Lower bound on inferior sampling). Let N˜T :=
∑T
t=1 1
{
pit = 1, Xt ∈ H˜
}
be the number
of times policy pi pulls arm 1 when covariates fall into the hypercube H˜. We will show that with a
strictly positive probability one has N˜T <
ρT∆
3 conditional on the event A¯. This will imply that policy
pi makes at least
ρT∆
3 number of mistakes under the problem m = 1.
Denote by ρ0 and ρ1 the distribution of N˜T under the problems m = 0 and m = 1 conditional on
the event A¯. Define the test function Ψ(x) = 1
{
x ≥ ρT∆3
}
. With this choice of ρ0, ρ1, and Ψ, one can
apply Lemma 7.5 to obtain
Ppi,φ0
{
N˜T ≥
ρT∆
3
∣∣∣∣ A¯ }+ Ppi,φ1 {N˜T < ρT∆3
∣∣∣∣ A¯ } ≥ 12 exp(−KL(ρ0, ρ1)).
In order to lower bound the right hand side of this inequality, we note that
Epi,φ0
[
LT
∣∣ A¯ ] = T∑
s=1
Epi,φ0
[
LT
∣∣∣ A¯, N˜T = s]Ppi,φ0 {N˜T = s ∣∣∣ A¯ }
≥
T∑
s=1
log
Ppi,φ0
{
N˜T = s
∣∣∣ A¯ }
Ppi,φ1
{
N˜T = s
∣∣∣ A¯ }
Ppi,φ0 {N˜T = s ∣∣∣ A¯ } = KL(ρ0, ρ1),
where the inequality follows from Lemma 7.6. The last two displays along with (A.6) yield
Ppi,φ0
{
N˜T ≥
ρT∆
3
∣∣∣∣ A¯ }+ Ppi,φ1 {N˜T < ρT∆3
∣∣∣∣ A¯ } ≥ 12 exp(−1).
To show that Ppi,φ0
{
N˜T ≥ ρT∆3
∣∣∣ A¯ } is small, we apply Markov’s inequality:
Ppi,φ0
{
N˜T ≥
ρT∆
3
∣∣∣∣ A¯ } ≤ Epi,φ0
[
N˜T
∣∣∣ A¯ ]
ρT∆
3
(a)
≤ S
∗
γ,α(T ) + c4T
−2
ρT∆
3
≤ c3[S
∗
γ,α]
1
2 + c2l
−dT−2
ρT
2
≤ c4T− 12 ≤ 1
4
exp(−1)
for large enough T and some constant c3, c4 > 0, where (a) follows from (A.5). The last two displays
yield that for large enough T , one has
Ppi,φ1
{
N˜T <
ρT∆
3
∣∣∣∣ A¯ } ≥ 14e.
Note that by definition, when the event A¯ holds, at least 2ρT∆3 number of contexts fall into the hypercube
H˜, that is,
S¯pi(T ;φ1) ≥
ρT∆
3
Ppi,φ1
{
N˜T <
ρT∆
3
∣∣∣∣ A¯ } ≥ ρT∆12e ≥ c5T [S∗γ,α(T )]− 12 , (A.7)
for some constant c5 > 0.
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Step 8 (From inferior sampling rate to regret). Note that Spi1,α(T ) ≥ S¯pi(φ1;T ). That is, by
putting together (A.7), (A.5), and Lemma 7.1, one obtains
Rpi1,α(T ) ≥ CT 1−
1
2α
[R∗γ,α(T )]− 12 ,
for some constant C > 0. This concludes the proof. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
The following lemma characterizes a general class of self-similar payoff functions for any non-integer
smoothness parameter β ∈ [β, β¯].
Lemma A.1. Fix dimension d, some positive non-integer β and some β¯ ≥ β. Consider some set of
payoff functions {fk}k such that fk ∈ H(β), k ∈ K. Suppose f1(x) = a+bxβ1 for x1 ∈ [0, c] where a, b and
0 ≤ c ≤ 1 are some constants. Then, the set of payoff functions {fk}k is self-similar as in Definition 4.1.
Proof. It suffices to show that for any non-negative integer p, one has
max
B∈Bl
max
k∈K
sup
x∈B
∣∣Γpl fk(x;B)− fk(x)∣∣ ≥ b′2−lβ,
for any l ≥ l0 = dlog 1c e and some b′ > 0. Fix some l > l0. Let B0 := [0, 2−l]d. One has
max
B∈Bl
max
k∈K
sup
x∈B
∣∣Γpl fk(x;B)− fk(x)∣∣ ≥ ∣∣Γpl f1(0;B0)− f1(0)∣∣ = b ∣∣Γpl g(0;B0)∣∣ , (A.8)
where g(x) = xβ. By Part 1 of Lemma B.1, one has Γpl g(0;B0) = e
>
1 B
−1W , where
e1 = (1 {s = 0})s∈{0,1,...,p} , B =
(
1
s1 + s2 + 1
)
s1,s2∈{0,1,...,p}
, W =
(
2−lβ
s+ β + 1
)
s∈{0,1,...,p}
.
By Cramer’s rule for linear matrix equations, one has
Γpl g(0;B0) =
det(B1)
det(B)
2−lβ, (A.9)
where
B1 =

1
β+1
1
2
1
3 . . .
1
p+1
1
β+2
1
3
1
4 . . .
1
p+2
1
β+3
1
4
1
5 . . .
1
p+3
...
...
... . . .
...
1
β+p+1
1
p+2
1
p+3 . . .
1
2p+1

.
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Note that one can rewrite both matrices B and B1 as follows
B =
(
1
ui + wj
)
1≤i,j≤p+1
, ui = i, wj = j − 1;
B1 =
(
1
u′i + w
′
j
)
1≤i,j≤p+1
, u′i = i, w
′
j = β1 {j = 1}+ (j − 1)1 {j > 1} .
The next theorem shows that the determinants of B and B1 are non-zero.
Theorem A.2 (Cauchy double alternant determinant). For any set of indeterminates {ui}1≤i≤n and
{vj}1≤j≤n such that ui + vj 6= 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, one has
det
(
1
ui + wj
)
1≤i,j≤n
=
∏
1≤i<j≤n(ui − uj)(wi − wj)∏
1≤i 6=j≤n(ui + wj)
.
Hence, putting together A.8 and A.9 yields that for any integer l > l0,
max
B∈Bl
max
k∈K
sup
x∈B
∣∣Γpl fk(x;B)− fk(x)∣∣ ≥ bdet(B1)det(B) 2−lβ.
This concludes the proof. 
Using Lemma A.1, one can adjust the lower bound arguments in Rigollet and Zeevi (2010) and Hu
et al. (2019) in order to establish the same lower bounds for optimal regret when payoff functions are
self-similar. We provide here the proof of the second part of the theorem; the proof of the first part is
very similar, except for using Theorem 4.1 in Rigollet and Zeevi (2010) instead of Theorem 3 in Hu et al.
(2019). First, we define the class of problems of interest.
Definition A.3. For any β ≥ 0 and α ≥ 0, we denote by P˜(β, α, d) = P˜(β, L, α,C0, ρ, ρ¯) the class
of problems P =
(
PX ,P
(1)
Y |X ,P
(2)
Y |X
)
that satisfy Assumption 1 for β and L > 0, Assumption 3 for
α and some C0 > 0, and the following assumption regarding covariate distribution: the covariate
density pX has a compact support X ⊆ [0, 1]d and ρ ≤ pX(x) ≤ ρ for some ρ ≥ ρ > 0 and x ∈
X . Furthermore, For any β ≤ 1, β¯ > β, β ∈ [β, β¯], and α ≥ 0, we define by P˜ss(β, β¯, β, α, d) :={
P ∈ P˜(β, α, d) : P satisfies Assumption 4
}
the corresponding class of problems with self-similar payoffs.
In their Theorem 3, Hu et al. (2019) construct a problem instance P∗ ∈ P˜(β, α, d) such that Rpi(P∗;T ) ≥
CT
1−β(α+1)
2β+d for some constant C > 0. Let {f∗k}k be the set of payoff functions of P∗. Define the set of
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payoff functions {f∗∗k }k such that
f∗∗k (x) :=

1+L1x
β
1
2 if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 18 ,
1+L1u(x1)x
β
1
2 if
1
8 ≤ x1 ≤ 14 ,
1
2 if
1
4 ≤ x1 ≤ 12 ,
L1f
∗
k (g(x)) if
1
2 ≤ x1 ≤ 1,
where L1 > 0 is some constant and we define
g(x) :=

2x1 − 1
x2
x3
...
xd

, u(x1) :=
∫ 1
4
x1
exp
(
−1
|s− 18 ||s− 14 |
)
ds
∫ 1
4
1
8
exp
(
−1
|s− 18 ||s− 14 |
)
ds
.
Now, we show that f∗∗k ∈ H(β), k ∈ K. Note that u(x1) is infinitely differentiable over [18 , 14 ] and
xβ1 ∈ H(β). Hence, by the following lemma, u(x1)xβ1 ∈ H[ 1
8
, 1
4
](β).
Lemma A.4. Suppose f, g ∈ HX (β, L) for some X ⊆ [0, 1], β > 0, and L > 0, and define the function
h := f · g as the product of f and g. Then, h ∈ H(β, L′) for some L′ > 0.
Furthermore, any derivative of f∗∗k up to degree bβc exists for x1 ∈ {18 , 14 , 12}. Hence, f∗∗k ∈ H(β). One
can also make L1 > 0 small enough so that f
∗∗
k ∈ H(β, L). Finally, by Lemma A.1, the set of payoff
functions {f∗∗k }k is self-similar. Now, let P∗∗ be a problem instance that is the same as P∗ except for its
payoff functions that are {f∗∗k }k. One can perform a similar analysis as in the proof of Theorem 3 in Hu
et al. (2019) in order to show that Rpi(P∗∗;T ) ≥ CT 1−
β(α+1)
2β+d . This concludes the proof. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5.6
Let r˜ := b2 log2( γ2C14 ) + 2lβ + ( dβ + 1) log2 log T c where the constant C14 was introduced in Proposition
C.2. We will prove the result by bounding the following probability
P
∃r ≤ r˜ : supk∈K,x∈M(B)
∣∣∣fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)1 )− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)2 )∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
2r/2

≤
∑
r∈[r˜]
∑
k∈K
∑
x∈M(B)
P
∣∣∣fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)1 )− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)2 )∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
2r/2
 . (A.10)
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Note that by the triangle inequality,∣∣∣fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)1 )− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)2 )∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣fk(x)− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)1 )∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣fk(x)− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)2 )∣∣∣ .
That is,
P
∣∣∣fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)1 )− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)2 )∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
2r/2

≤ P
∣∣∣fk(x)− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)1 )∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
21+r/2

+ P
∣∣∣fk(x)− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)2 )∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
21+r/2
 . (A.11)
Note that since when r ≤ r˜ one has γ(log T )
d
2β
+12
21+r/2
≥ C142−βjB1 ≥ C142−βjB2 , one can apply Proposition C.2
to bound the two terms on the right hand side of above inequality. Namely, one can apply Proposition
C.2 with n = 2r, µ =
ρ
ρ¯2−dl , µ¯ =
ρ¯
ρ2−dl , δ =
γ(log T )
d
2β
+12
21+r/2
, and h = 2−jB1 for the first term and h = 2−jB2
for the second term to obtain
P
∣∣∣fk(x)− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)1 )∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
21+r/2
 ≤ C˜12T−γ2C˜13 ,
P
∣∣∣fk(x)− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)2 )∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
21+r/2
 ≤ C˜12T−γ2C˜13 ,
where the constants C˜12, C˜13 depend only on L, ρ, ρ¯, and d. These two inequalities along with (A.10)
and (A.11) imply
P
∃r ≤ r˜ : supk∈K,x∈M(B)
∣∣∣fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)1 )− fˆ (B,r)k (x; j(B)2 )∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
2r/2
 ≤ 21−ld ∣∣∣M(B)∣∣∣ r˜C˜12T−γ2C˜13
≤ C72−ld (log T )
d
β T−γ
2C8+C9 ,
where the constants C7, C8, C9 depend only on β, β¯, L, ρ, ρ¯, and d. The results follows by applying union
bound over B ∈ Bl. This concludes the proof. 
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 5.7
By Assumption 4, there exists at least one bin B˜ ∈ Bl, an arm k˜ ∈ K, and a point xˆ ∈ B˜ such that∣∣∣∣Γ0j(B)1 fk(xˆ; B˜)− fk(xˆ)
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Γbβ¯cl fk(xˆ)− fk(xˆ; B˜)∣∣∣ ≥ b2−lβ. (A.12)
Let x˜ = arg minx∈M(B)‖x − xˆ‖∞ (if there is more than one minimizer we choose the one with the
minimum L1-norm). Note that ‖x˜− xˆ‖∞≤ 2−l˜, which along with the assumption fk˜ ∈ H(β, L) implies
that ∣∣fk˜(x˜)− fk˜(xˆ)∣∣ ≤ L‖x˜− xˆ‖β∞≤ L2−l˜β ≤ Llog T 2−lβ. (A.13)
In addition, by Lemma B.1, one has
∣∣∣Γbβ¯cl fk˜(xˆ; B˜)− Γbβ¯cl fk˜(x˜; B˜)∣∣∣ ≤ κ02l‖xˆ− x˜‖∞≤ κ02l−l˜ ≤ κ0log T 2−lβ, (A.14)
where κ0 was introduced in Lemma B.1. Let rˆ := b2 log2( 4γL∧κ0 ) + 2lβ + ( dβ + 3) log2 log T c. One has
P
{
r
(B˜)
last > rˆ
}
≤ P
∣∣∣fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k˜ (x˜; j(B˜)1 )− fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k˜ (x˜; j(B˜)2 )∣∣∣ < γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
2rˆ/2
 . (A.15)
Note that by the triangle inequality,
(A.16)
∣∣∣fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k (x˜; j(B˜)1 )− fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k˜ (x˜; j(B˜)2 )∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣fk˜(x˜)− fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k˜ (x˜; j(B˜)1 )∣∣∣− ∣∣∣fk˜(x˜)− fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k˜ (x˜; j(B˜)2 )∣∣∣ .
Note that since one has γ(log T )
d
2β
+12
21+rˆ/2
≥ C142−βjB2 , one can apply Proposition C.2 to show that second
term on the right hand side of above inequality is “small” with high probability. Namely, one can apply
Proposition C.2 with n = 2rˆ, µ =
ρ
ρ¯2−dl , µ¯ =
ρ¯
ρ2−dl , δ =
γ(log T )
d
2β
+12
21+rˆ/2
, and h = 2−jB2 to obtain
P
∣∣∣fk˜(x˜)− fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k˜ (x˜; j(B˜)2 )∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
21+rˆ/2
 ≤ C˜12T−γ2C˜13 , (A.17)
where the constants C˜12, C˜13 depend only on β¯, L, ρ, ρ¯, and d. Now, we show that the first term on the
right hand side of (A.15) cannot get “small” with high probability. One can write
(A.18)
∣∣∣fk˜(x˜)− fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k˜ (x˜; j(B˜)1 )∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣fk˜(x˜)− Γbβ¯cj(B)1 fk˜(x˜; B˜)
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣Γbβ¯cj(B)1 fk˜(x˜; B˜)− fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k˜ (x˜; j(B˜)1 )
∣∣∣∣ .
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The first term corresponds to bias and the second term corresponds to stochastic error. Note that by
(A.12), (A.13), and (A.14), one has∣∣∣∣fk˜(x˜)− Γbβ¯cj(B)1 fk˜(x˜; B˜)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∣fk˜(xˆ)− Γbβ¯cj(B)1 fk˜(xˆ; B˜)
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣fk˜(x˜)− fk˜(xˆ)∣∣− ∣∣∣∣Γbβ¯cj(B)1 fk˜(xˆ; B˜)− Γbβ¯cj(B)1 fk˜(x˜; B˜)
∣∣∣∣
≥ b2−lβ − L
log T
2−lβ − κ0
log T
2−lβ ≥ L ∧ κ0
2 log T
2−lβ ≥ 2γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
2rˆ/2
(A.19)
for large enough T ≥ T0(L, b, ρ, ρ¯, d). In order to bound the second term on the right hand side of-
(A.18), we apply Proposition C.3, with n = 2rˆ, δ = γ(log T )
d
2β
+12
21+rˆ/2
, and h = 2−jB1 to obtain
P

∣∣∣∣Γbβ¯cj(B)1 fk(x˜; B˜)− fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k (x˜; j(B˜)1 )
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
21+rˆ/2
 ≤ C˜15T−γ2C˜16 , (A.20)
where the constants C˜15, C˜16 depend only on β¯, L, ρ, ρ¯, and d. Putting together (A.15), (A.16), (A.18),
and (A.19), one obtains
P
{
r
(B˜)
last > rˆ
}
≤ P

∣∣∣∣Γbβ¯cj(B)1 fk(x˜; B˜)− fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k (x˜; j(B˜)1 )
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
21+rˆ/2

+ P

∣∣∣∣Γbβ¯cj(B)1 fk(x˜; B˜)− fˆ (B˜,rˆ)k (x˜; j(B˜)1 )
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ (log T )
d
2β
+ 1
2
21+rˆ/2

≤ C10T−γ2C11 ,
where the last inequality follows from (A.17) and (A.20), and the constants C10, C11 depend only on
β¯, L, ρ, ρ¯, and d. This concludes the proof. 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Note that for large enough T , one has
P
{
βˆSACB ∈ [β − 3(2β + d)
2 log2 log T
(β + d− 1) log2 T
, β]
}
≤ P
{
2lβ + (
d
β
+ 1) log2 log T ≤ r(B)last ≤ 2lβ + (
d
β
+ 4) log2 log T
}
≤ 1− C72ld (log T )
d
β T−γ
2C8+C9 − C10T−γ2C11 ,
where the last inequality follows from Propositions 5.6, and 5.7, and the constants C7, C8, C9 > 0 were
introduced in Proposition 5.6, and the constants C10, C11 > 0 were introduced in Proposition 5.7.
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Next, we show that with high probability, TSACB ≤ 4ρ (log T )
2d
β
+4
T
(β+d−1)
(2β+d) =: T¯SACB. Note that
the smoothness estimation sub-routine terminates when all the bins B ∈ Bl have reached round
r¯ = d2lβ¯ + (2dβ + 4) log2 log T e. That is, TSACB is less than the time step by which 2
∑r¯
r=r 2
r contexts
have realized in each B ∈ Bl. Note that
r¯∑
r=r
2r ≤ 2r¯+1 ≤ 2 (log T )
2d
β
+4
T
2β(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2 .
Let N¯ (B) :=
∑T¯SACB
t=1 Zt be the number of contexts that have realized in B by t = T¯SACB, where Zt’s
are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with E [Zt] ≥ ρT−
d(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2 and Var(Zt) ≤ E
[
Z2t
] ≤ ρ¯T− d(β+d−1)(2β+d)2 .
Applying Bernstein’s inequality in Lemma 7.4 to N¯ (B) with a = 2 (log T )
2d
β
+4
T
2β(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2 yields:
P
{
N¯ (B) < 2 (log T )
2d
β
+4
T
2β(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2
}
≤ exp
(
− a
2
2T¯SACBVar(Zt) + a
)
≤ exp
(
− ρ
4ρ¯+ 2ρ
(log T )
2d
β
+4
T
2β(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2
)
,
and, by the union bound:
P
{
TSACB > T¯SACB
} ≤ ∑
B∈Bl
P
{
N¯ (B) < 2 (log T )
2d
β
+4
T
2β(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2
}
≤ 2T
d(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2 exp
(
− ρ
4ρ¯+ 2ρ
(log T )
2d
β
+4
T
2β(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2
)
.
This concludes the proof. 
A.7 Proof of Theorem 5.2
The regret incurred by the SACB policy up to t = bT¯SACBc is bounded by
Epi
bT¯SACBc∑
t=1
fpi∗t (Xt)− fpit(Xt)
 ≤ T · P{TSACB > T¯SACB}+ T¯SACB
(a)
≤ 2T 1+
d(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2 exp
(
− ρ
4ρ¯+ 2ρ
(log T )
2d
β
+4
T
2β(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2
)
+
4
ρ
(log T )
2d
β
+4
T
(β+d−1)
(2β+d)
(b)
= o
(
T
1−β(α+1)
2β+d
)
, (A.21)
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where (a) follows from Theorem 5.1 and (b) holds by
(β+d−1)
(2β+d)
≤ 1 − β(α+1)2β+d for any β ≤ β ≤ β¯ and
α ≤ 1min{1,β} . Define βˆT := β − 3(2β+d)
2 log2 log T
(β+d−1) log2 T . The regret from t = bT¯SACBc+ 1 to t = T is bounded by
Epi
 T∑
t=bT¯SACBc+1
fpi∗t (Xt)− fpit(Xt)
 ≤ T · P{βˆSACB 6∈ [βˆT , β]}+ C¯0 (log T )ι0(βˆT ,α,d) T 1−
ˆ
βT (α+1)
2
ˆ
βT+d
≤ C4 (log T )
d
β T
−γ2C5+C6+1+ d(β+d−1)
(2β+d)2
+ CT
1−β(α+1)
2β+d (log T )
3d(α+1)(2β+d)2
(2β+d)(β+d)(β+d−1)+ι0(βˆT ,α,d) , (A.22)
for some constant C > 0, where the last inequality follows from Corollary 5.1 and the constants C4, C5,
and C6 were introduced in Theorem 5.1. Putting together (A.21) and (A.22) concludes the proof. 
A.8 Proof of Corollary 5.3
The result follows from Theorem 5.2 and the fact that for any β0 ≤ 1:
sup
P∈P(β0,α,d)
RABSE(β0)(P;T ) = O
(
T ζ(β0,α,d)
)
.

A.9 Proof of Corollary 5.4
The result follows from Theorem 5.2 and since for any problem instance P ∈ P(β0, α, d), and decision
regions which satisfy the regularity condition in Assumption 5, one has for any β0 ≥ 1:
RSmoothBandit(β0)(P;T ) = O
(
(log T )
2β0+d
2β0 T ζ(β0,α,d)
)
.

A.10 Proof of Remark 1
Note that
pi0(β0) =
ABSE(β0) if β0 ≤ 1;SmoothBandit(β0) if β0 > 1.
Furthermore, for any β0 ≤ 1
sup
P∈P(β0,α,d)
RABSE(β0)(P;T ) = O
(
T ζ(β0,α,d)
)
,
and for any β0 > 1 and any problem instance P ∈ P(β0, α, d), and decision regions which satisfy the
regularity condition in Assumption 5,
RSmoothBandit(β0)(P;T ) = O
(
(log T )
2β0+d
2β0 T ζ(β0,α,d)
)
.
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The result follows from applying Theorem 5.2 with
ι0(β0, α, d) :=
0 if β0 ≤ 1;2β0
2β0+d
o.w.

B Properties of the L2(PX)-projection
Lemma B.1. Fix non-negative integers l and p, an bin U of side-length 2−l′ , l′ ∈ R+, and some point
x ∈ U and let K(·) = 1 {‖·‖∞≤ 1} and h = 2−l. Let µ0, κ0, and L0 be some constants that only depend
on p, ρ, ρ¯ (introduced in Assumption 2), and d. The following statements hold:
1. Γpl f(x;U) = R
>(0)B−1W, where we define the vector R(u) := (us)|s|≤p, the matrix B := (Bs1,s2)|s1|,|s2|≤p,
and the vector W := (Ws)|s|≤p with elements
Bs1,s2 :=
∫
Rd
us1+s2K(u)pX(x+ hu | U)du, Ws :=
∫
Rd
usf(x+ hu)K(u)pX(x+ hu | U)du;
2. λmin(B) ≥ µ02dl′ ;
3.
∣∣Γpl f(x;U)− Γpl f(xˆ;U)∣∣ ≤ κ0h−1‖xˆ− x‖∞ for all x, xˆ ∈ U ;
4. If f ∈ H(β, L) for 0 < β ≤ p+ 1 then, ∣∣Γpl f(x;U)− f(x)∣∣ ≤ L0hβ for all x ∈ U .
Proof. Fix some x ∈ U . Let θ˜(u; p, l, U) := ∑|s|≤p ξsus be a polynomial of degree p on Rd that minimizes
∫
U
∣∣∣∣f(u)− θ˜(u− xh ; p, l, U
)∣∣∣∣2K (u− xh
)
pX(u | U)du =
∫
U
f2(u)K
(
u− x
h
)
pX(u | U)du
+
∑
|s1|,|s2|≤p
ξs1ξs2
∫
U
(
u− x
h
)s1+s2
K
(
u− x
h
)
pX(u | U)du
− 2
∑
|s|≤p
ξs
∫
U
f(u)
(
u− x
h
)s
K
(
u− x
h
)
pX(u | U)du,
where h = 2−l. Equivalently, θ˜(u; p, l, U) can be characterized by its vector of coefficients ξ that minimizes
∑
|s1|,|s2|≤p
ξs1ξs2
∫
Rd
us1+s2K(u)pX(x+hu | U)du−2
∑
|s|≤p
ξs
∫
Rd
f(u)usK(u)pX(x+hu | U)du = ξ>Bξ−2W>ξ,
(B.1)
where we define the matrix B := (Bs1,s2)|s1|,|s2|≤p and the vector W := (Ws)|s|≤p with elements
Bs1,s2 :=
∫
Rd
us1+s2K(u)pX(x+ hu | U)du, Ws :=
∫
Rd
f(u)usK(u)pX(x+ hu | U)du.
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Note that if B is a positive definite matrix then, the minimizer of (B.1) is ξ = B−1W , which implies the
desired result: Γpl f(x;U) = R
>(0)B−1W . In order to show that this is indeed the case, we note that
λmin(B) = min‖Z‖=1
Z>BZ =
∫
U
∑
|s|≤p
Zsu
s
2K(u)pX(x+ hu | U)du ≥ ρ2dl′
ρ¯
∫
A
∑
|s|≤p
Zsu
s
2 du,
where A =
{
u ∈ Rd : ‖u‖∞≤ 1;x+ hu ∈ U
}
. Note that
λ[A] ≥ h−dλ [Ξ(x, h) ∩ U ] ≥ 2−dh−dλ [Ξ(x, h)] = 2−dλ [Ξ(0, 1)]
. Let A denote the class of compact subsets of Ξ(0, 1) having the Lebesgue measure 2−dλ [Ξ(0, 1)]. Using
the previous display, we obtain
λmin(B) ≥
ρ2dl
′
ρ¯
min
‖Z‖≤1;S∈A
∫
S
∑
|s|≤p
Zsu
s
2 du =: ρ2dl′
ρ¯
µ˜0. (B.2)
By the compactness argument, the minimum in the above expression exists, and is strictly positive.
In order to prove the last claim in the lemma, note that for any xˆ ∈ U ,
∣∣Γpl f(x;U)− Γpl f(xˆ;U)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣θ˜(0; p, l, U)− θ˜( xˆ− xh ; p, l, U
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
|s|≤p,s 6=(0,...,0)
ξs
(
xˆ− x
h
)s∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤Mh−1‖xˆ− x‖∞‖ξ‖.
Also, by (B.2), one has
‖ξ‖≤ ∥∥B−1W∥∥ ≤ 2−dl′ ρ¯
ρ
µ˜−10 M
1
2 max
s
|Ws|,
and
|Ws|=
∣∣∣∣∫
Rd
usf(x+ hu)K(u)pX(x+ hu|U)du
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫
Rd
K(u)pX(x+ hu|U)du ≤ 2dl′ .
Putting together the above three displays, one obtains
∣∣Γpl f(x;U)− Γpl f(xˆ;U)∣∣ ≤ ρ¯ρ−1µ˜−10 M3/2h−1‖xˆ− x‖∞.
To prove the last part, define the vector Z := (Zs)|s|≤p with elements
Zs :=
h|s|f (s)(x)
s!
· 1 {|s|≤ bβc} .
47
Note that
f(x) = R>(0)B−1BZ.
As a result, one has
∣∣f(x)− Γpl f(x;U)∣∣ = ∣∣∣R>(0)B−1 (BZ −W )∣∣∣ ≤ ‖B−1‖· ‖BZ −W‖ ≤ 2−dl′ ρ¯ρµ˜0 M 12 maxs |(BZ)s −Ws|,
where the last inequality follows from (B.2). Furthermore, one has
|(BZ)s −Ws| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Rd
us
 ∑
|s′|≤bβc
(hu)sf (s)(x)
s!
− f(x+ hu)
K(u)pX(x+ hu | U)du
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
Rd
|us|
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
|s′|≤bβc
(hu)sf (s)(x)
s!
− f(x+ hu)
∣∣∣∣∣∣K(u)pX(x+ hu | U)du
≤
∫
Rd
LhβpX(x+ hu | U)du = Lhβ2dl′
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that f ∈ H(β, L). Putting the last two displays
together, the result follows. This concludes the proof. 
C Proofs and analysis for the review of local polynomial regression
In this section of the appendix, we provide the proofs for our review of the local polynomial regression
estimation method. Fix a set of pairs D = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1,a point x ∈ Rd, a bandwidth h > 0, an integer
p > 0 and a kernel function K : Rd → R+. Define the matrix Q := (Qs1,s2)|s1|,|s2|≤p and the vector
V := (Vs)|s|≤p with the elements
Qs1,s2 :=
n∑
i=1
(Xi − x)s1+s2K
(
Xi − x
h
)
, Vs :=
n∑
i=1
Yi(Xi − x)sK
(
Xi − x
h
)
.
Also, define the matrix U := (us)|s|≤p. The next result from Audibert and Tsybakov (2007) provides a
closed-form expression for local polynomial regression at any arbitrary point.
Lemma C.1 (Audibert and Tsybakov 2007, Proposition 2.1). If the matrix Q is positive definite, there
exists a polynomial on Rd of degree p minimizing (5.3). Its vector of coefficients is given by ξ = Q−1V
and the corresponding local polynomial regression function at point x is given by
ηˆLP(x;D, h, p) = U(0)>Q−1V =
n∑
i=1
YiK
(
Xi − x
h
)
U(0)>Q−1U(Xi − x).
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The following simple extension of Theorem 3.2 in Audibert and Tsybakov (2007) will be one of the main
tools to bound our estimation error in our proposed policy.
Proposition C.2. Let D = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1 be a set of n i.i.d pairs (Xi, Yi) ∈ X × R. If the marginal
density µ of Xi’s satisfies µ ≤ µ(x) ≤ µ¯ for some 0 < µ ≤ µ¯ with a support X that is a closed hypercube
in Rd of side-length 2−l, l ≥ 0, and the function η belongs to the Ho¨lder class of functions HX (β, L)
for some β, L > 0 then, there exist constants C12, C13, C14 > 0 such that for any 0 < h < 2
−l, any
C14h
β < δ, any n ≥ 1 and the kernel function K(·) = 1 {‖·‖∞≤ 1}, the local polynomial estimator
ηˆLP(x;D, h, p) satisfies ∣∣ηˆLP(x;D, h, p)− η(x)∣∣ ≤ δ
with probability at least 1− C12 exp
(−C13nhdµ2µ¯−1δ2) for all x ∈ X . The constants C1, C2, C3 depend
only on p, d, L.
The next proposition states that local polynomial regression estimation of a function inside a hypercube
cannot largely deviate from the L2(PX)-projection of that function with high probability.
Proposition C.3. Fix a hypercube U ⊆ (0, 1)d with side-length 2−l′, l′ ∈ R+. Let D = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1
be a set of n i.i.d pairs (Xi, Yi) ∈ U × R. If the marginal density µ of Xi’s satisfies µ(·) = pX(·|U),
where pX is the density of a distribution PX that satisfies Assumption 2 then, there exist constants
C15, C16, C17 > 0 such that for any δ < C17, any n ≥ 1, h = 2−l, l ≥ l′, and the kernel function
K(·) = 1 {‖·‖∞≤ 1}, the local polynomial estimator ηˆLP(x;D, h, p) satisfies
∣∣ηˆLP(x;D, h, p)− Γpl η(x;U)∣∣ ≤ δ
with probability at least 1−C15 exp
(
−C16n2d(l′−l)δ2
)
for all x ∈ U . The constants C15, C16, C17 depend
only on p, ρ¯, ρ, and d.
C.1 Proof of Proposition C.2
The proof is a simple extension of the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Audibert and Tsybakov (2007); however,
we provide the proof for completeness. Fix x ∈ X and δ > 0. Consider the matrices B := (Bs1,s2)|s1|,|s2|≤p
and B¯ :=
(
B¯s1,s2
)
|s1|,|s2|≤p with the elements
Bs1,s2 :=
∫
Rd
us1+s2K(u)µ(x+ hu)du, B¯s1,s2 :=
1
nhd
n∑
i=1
(
Xi − x
h
)s1+s2
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
.
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The smallest eignevalue of B¯ satisfies
λmin(B¯) = min‖W‖=1
W>B¯W
≥ min
‖W‖=1
W>BW + min
‖W‖=1
W>(B¯ −B)W
≥ min
‖W‖=1
W>BW −
∑
|s1|,|s2|≤p
|B¯s1,s2 −Bs1,s2 |. (C.1)
Define Xn :=
{
u ∈ Rd : ‖u‖≤ 1;x+ hu ∈ X}. For any vector W satisfying ‖W‖= 1, we obtain
W>BW =
∫
Rd
∑
|s|≤p
Wsus
2K(u)µ(x+ hu)du ≥ µ ∫
Xn
∑
|s|≤p
Wsus
2 du.
Since X is a closed hypercube and we have assumed that h ≤ l, we get
λ[Xn] ≥ h−dλ[Ball2(x, h) ∩ X ] ≥ 2−dh−dλ[Ball2(x, h)] ≥ 2−dλ[Ball2(0, 1)],
where Ball2(x, h) is the Euclidean ball of radius h centered around x.
LetA denote the class of all compact subsets of Ball2(0, 1) having the Lebesgue measure 2−dλ[Ball2(0, 1)].
Using the previous display, we obtain
min
‖W‖=1
W>BW ≥ µ min
‖W‖=1;S∈A
∫
S
∑
|s|≤p
Wsus
2 du =: 2cµ (C.2)
By the compactness argument, the above minimum exists and is strictly positive.
For i = 1, . . . , n and any multi-indices s1, s2 such that |s1|, |s2|≤ p, define
T
(s1,s2)
i :=
1
hd
(
Xi − x
h
)s1+s2
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
−
∫
Rd
us1+s2K(u)µ(x+ hu)du.
We have ET (s1,s2)i = 0, |T (s1,s2)i |≤ 2h−d, and the following bound on the variance of T (s1,s2)i :
VarT (s1,s2)i ≤
1
h2d
E
[(
Xi − x
h
)2s1+2s2
K2
(
Xi − x
h
)]
≤ 1
hd
∫
Rd
u2s1+2s2K2(u)µ(x+ hu|B)du
≤ µ¯
hd
max
j≤p
∫
Rd
(1 + |u4j |)K2(u)du =: κµ¯
hd
.
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From Bernstein’s inequality, we get
P
{|B¯s1,s2 −Bs1,s2 |> } = P
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
T
(s1,s2)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > 
}
≤ 2 exp
( −nhd2
2κµ¯+ 4/3
)
This inequality along with (C.1) and (C.2) imply that
P
{
λmin(B¯) ≤ cµ
} ≤ 2M2 exp( −nhdM−4c2µ2
2κµ¯+ 4M−2cµ/3
)
, (C.3)
where M2 is the number of elements in the matrix B¯. In what follows assume that λmin(B¯) ≥ cµ.
Therefore,
P
{∣∣ηˆLP(x;D, h, p)− η(x)∣∣ ≥ δ} ≤ P{λmin(B¯) ≤ cµ}+ P{∣∣ηˆLP(x;D, h, p)− η(x)∣∣ ≥ δ, λmin(B¯) > cµ} .
(C.4)
We now evaluate the second term on the right hand side of the above inequality. Define the matrix
Z := (Zi,s) 1 ≤ i ≤ n, |s|≤ p with elements
Zi,s := (Xi − x)s
√
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
.
The s-th column of Z is denoted by Zs, and we introduce Z
(η) :=
∑
|s|≤bβc
η(s)(x)
s! Zs. Since Q = Z
>Z we
get
∀|s|≤ bβc : U>(0)Q−1Z>Z = 1 {s = (0, . . . , 0)} ,
hence R>(0)Q−1Z>Z(η) = η(x). So we can write
ηˆLP(x;D, h, p)− η(x) = R>(0)Q−1
(
V − Z>Z(η)
)
= R>(0)B¯−1a,
where a := 1
nhd
H
(
V − Z>Z(η)) ∈ RM and H is a diagonal matrix H := (Hs1,s2)|s1|,|s2|≤p with elements
Hs1,s2 := h
−s11 {s1 = s2}. For λmin(B¯) > cµ, one has
∣∣ηˆLP(x;D, h, p)− η(x)∣∣ ≤ ‖B¯−1a‖≤ λ−1min(B¯)‖a‖≤ c−1µ−1M maxs ‖as‖, (C.5)
where as are the components of the vector a given by
as =
1
nhd
n∑
i=1
[Yi − ηx(Xi)]
(
Xi − x
h
)s
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
.
Note that ηx(Xi) is the Taylor expansion of η at x and of degree bβc (not necessarily p) evaluated at Xi.
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Define:
T
(s,1)
i := [Yi − η(Xi)]
(
Xi − x
h
)s
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
,
T
(s,2)
i := [η(X − i)− ηx(Xi)]
(
Xi − x
h
)s
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
.
One has
|as|≤
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
T
(s,1)
i
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
[
T
(s,2)
i − ET (s,2)i
]∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ET (s,2)i ∣∣∣ . (C.6)
Note that ET (s,1)i = 0,
∣∣∣T (s,1)i ∣∣∣ ≤ 2h−d, and
VarT (s,1)i ≤
1
4hd
∫
Rd
u2sK2(u)µ(x+ hu)du ≤ κµ¯
4hd
,∣∣∣T (s,2)i − ET (s,2)i ∣∣∣ ≤ Lhβ−d + Lκhβ ≤ Chβ−d,
VarT (s,2)i ≤ L2h2β−d
∫
Rd
|u2s|K2(u)µ(x+ hu) ≤ L2µ¯κh2β−d.
From Bernstein’s inequality, for 1, 2 > 0, we obtain
P
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
T
(s,1)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1
}
≤ 2 exp
( −nhd21
κµ¯/2 + 41/3
)
and
P
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
[
T
(s,2)
i − ET (s,2)i
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2
}
≤ 2 exp
( −nhd22
2L2κµ¯h2β + 2Chβ2/3
)
.
Since also ∣∣∣ET (s,2)i ∣∣∣ ≤ Lhβ ∫
Rd
|us|K2(u)µ(x+ hu)du ≤ Lκµ¯hβ
we get, using (C.6), that if 3Lκµ¯hβc−1µ−1M ≤ δ ≤ 1 the following inequality holds
P
{
|as|≥
cµδ
M
}
≤ P
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
T
(s,1)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > cµδ3M
}
+ P
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
[
T
(s,2)
i − ET (s,2)i
]∣∣∣∣∣ > cµδ3M
}
≤ 4 exp
(
−Cnhdµ2µ¯−1δ2
)
.
Combining this inequality with (C.3), (C.4), and (C.5), one has
P
{∣∣ηˆLP(x;D, h, p)− η(x)∣∣ ≥ δ} ≤ C12 exp(−C13nhdµ2µ¯−1δ2)
for 3Lκµ¯hβc−1µ−1M ≤ δ (for δ > 1, this inequality is obvious since η, ηˆLP take values in [0, 1]). The
constants C12, C13 do not depend on the density µ, on its support X and the point x ∈ X . This concludes
the proof. 
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C.2 Proof of Proposition C.3
Fix a bin U ⊆ (0, 1)d with side-length 2−l′ , l′ ∈ R+. Consider the matrix B := (Bs1,s2)|s1|,|s2|≤p and the
vector W := (Ws)|s|≤p with elements
Bs1,s2 :=
∫
Rd
us1+s2K(u)µ(x+ hu)du, Ws :=
∫
Rd
usη(x+ hu)K(u)µ(x+ hu)du,
as well as the matrix B¯ :=
(
B¯s1,s2
)
|s1|,|s2|≤p and the vector W¯ :=
(
W¯s
)
|s|≤p with elements
B¯s1,s2 :=
1
nhd
n∑
i=1
(
Xi − x
h
)s1+s2
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
, W¯s :=
1
nhd
n∑
i=1
Yi
(
Xi − x
h
)s
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
.
By Lemmas B.1 and C.1, one has∣∣ηˆLP(x;D, h, p)− Γpl η(x)∣∣ = ∣∣∣U(0)>Q−1V − U(0)>B−1W ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣U(0)>B¯−1W¯ − U(0)>B−1W ∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣U(0)>B−1 (W¯ −W )∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣U(0)> (B¯−1 −B−1) W¯ ∣∣∣ =: J1 + J2.
That is,
P
{∣∣ηˆLP(x;D, h, p)− Γpl η(x;U)∣∣ ≥ δ} ≤ P {J1 ≥ 3δ/4}+ P {J2 ≥ δ/4} . (C.7)
First, we analyze J1. Note that
J1 ≤ ‖B−1
(
W¯ −W ) ‖≤ λ−1min(B) ∥∥W¯ −W∥∥ ≤ µ−10 2−dl′ ∥∥W¯ −W∥∥ ≤ µ−10 2−dl′M maxs ∣∣W¯s −Ws∣∣ ,
(C.8)
where the third inequality follows from λmin(B) ≥ µ02dl′ by Lemma B.1, and M is the number of
elements in the vector W . Define:
T
(s)
i :=
1
hd
Yi
(
Xi − x
h
)s
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
−
∫
Rd
η(x+ hu)usK(u)pX(x+ hu|U)du.
We have E
[
T
(s)
i
]
= 0,
∣∣∣T (s)i ∣∣∣ ≤ 2h−d, and
Var
[
T
(s)
i
]
≤ 1
h2d
E
[(
Xi − x
h
)2s
K2
(
Xi − x
h
)]
≤ 1
hd
∫
Rd
u2sK2(u)pX(x+ hu|U)du ≤ 2
dl′
hd
.
By Bernstein’s inequality, we get
P
{∣∣W¯s −Ws∣∣ ≥ } = P{
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
T
(s)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > 
}
≤ 2 exp
( −nhd2
21+dl′ + 4/3
)
.
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Combining this inequality with (C.8), one obtains
P {J1 ≥ 3δ/4} ≤
∑
|s|≤p
P
{∣∣W¯s −Ws∣∣ ≥ 3µ02dl′M−1δ/4}
=
∑
|s|≤p
P
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
T
(s)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 3µ02dl′M−1δ/4
}
≤ 2M exp
(
−9µ20M−22d(l
′−l)nδ2/16
2 + µ0M−1δ
)
.
(C.9)
Now, we analyze J2. Note that
J2 ≤
∥∥(B¯−1 −B−1) W¯∥∥ ≤ ∥∥B¯−1 −B−1∥∥∥∥W¯∥∥ ≤M ∥∥B¯−1 −B−1∥∥ ·max
s
|W¯s|≤M
∥∥B¯−1 −B−1∥∥h−d.
(C.10)
Define Z := B¯ −B. One has
λmax(Z) ≤
∑
|s1|,|s2|≤p
|Zs1,s2 |.
Define
T
(s1,s2)
i :=
1
hd
(
Xi − x
h
)s1+s2
K
(
Xi − x
h
)
−
∫
Rd
us1+s2K(u)pX(x+ hu | U)du.
We have E
[
T
(s1,s2)
i
]
= 0, |T (s1,s2)i |≤ 2h−d, and
Var
[
T
(s1,s2)
i
]
≤ E
[
1
h2d
(
Xi − x
h
)2s1+2s2
K2
(
Xi − x
h
)]
=
1
hd
∫
Rd
u2s1+2s2K2(u)pX(x+hu|U)du ≤ 2
dl′
hd
.
By Bernstein’s inequality, one obtains
P
{
λmax(Z) ≥ 2dl′M−1µ20δ/8
}
≤ P
 ∑|s1|,|s2|≤p|Zs1,s2 |≥ 2dl
′
M−1µ20δ/8

≤
∑
|s1|,|s2|≤p
P
{
|Zs1,s2 |≥ 2dl
′
M−3µ20δ/8
}
=
∑
|s1|,|s2|≤p
P
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
T
(s1,s2)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ h−dM−3µ20δ/8
}
≤ 2M2 exp
(
−n2d(l′−l)M−6µ40δ2/64
2 +M−3µ20δ/6
)
.
By Lemma B.1,
∥∥B−1∥∥ ≤ 2−dl′µ−10 . That is, on the event {λmax(Z) ≤ 2dl′M−1µ20δ/8}, one has
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∥∥∥B− 12ZB− 12∥∥∥ ≤M−1µ0δ/8 in which case if M−1µ0δ/8 < 12 , one obtains
∥∥B¯−1 −B−1∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥B− 12 ((I +B− 12ZB− 12)−1 − I)B− 12∥∥∥∥
≤ ∥∥B−1∥∥∥∥∥∥(I +B− 12ZB− 12)−1 − I∥∥∥∥
≤ 2−dl′µ−10
∞∑
j=1
∥∥∥B− 12ZB− 12∥∥∥j
≤ 2−dl′µ−10
∞∑
j=1
(M−1µ0δ/8)j ≤ 2−dl′M−1δ/4.
This inequality along with (C.10) imply J2 ≤ δ/4. In other words,
P {J2 ≥ δ/4} ≤ P
{
λmax(Z) ≥ 2dl′M−1µ20δ/8
}
≤ 2M2 exp
(
−n2d(l′−l)M−6µ40δ2/64
2 +M−3µ20δ/6
)
.
Combining this inequality with (C.7) and (C.9) gives
P
{∣∣ηˆLP(x;D, h, p)− Γpl η(x;U)∣∣ ≥ δ} ≤ C15 exp(−C16n2d(l′−l)δ2)
if M−1µ0δ/8 < 12 . This concludes the proof. 
D Auxiliary analysis for Section 2.1
D.1 Analysis of Part 1 of Example 1
Step 1. Following the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Rigollet and Zeevi (2010), we first construct a problem
instance in P(β, α, d). Define M :=
2−1c−10 (2 log 2T ) −
ˆ
β
2
ˆ
β+d

1
β
and let B := {Bm, m = 1, . . . ,Md} be a
re-indexed collection of the hypercubes
Bm = Bm :=
{
x ∈ [0, 1]d : mi − 1
2l
≤ xi ≤ mi
2l
, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
}
,
for m = (m1, . . . ,md) with mi ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Consider the regular grid Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qMd}, where qk
denotes the center of bin Bk, k = 1, . . . ,M
d. Define C := 2β−1L ∧ 14 and let φ be defined as follows:
φ(x) =
(1− ‖x‖∞)
β if ‖x‖∞≤ 1
0 o.w.
.
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Define m := dµMd−αβe, where µ ∈ (0, 1) is chosen small enough to ensure m ≤Md. Define the payoff
functions as follows:
f1(x) =
1
2
+
m∑
j=1
M−βCφ (M [x− qj ]) , f2(x) = 1
2
,
and assume that covariates are distributed uniformly. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Rigollet
and Zeevi (2010), one can show that the margin condition and smoothness condition in Assumptions 3
and 1 are satisfied for the constructed problem instance.
Step 2. Next, we lower bound the regret of ABSE(βˆ) under the constructed problem instance. To do so,
we use the same exact terminology and notation as in Perchet and Rigollet (2013); for the sake of brevity,
we do not re-introduce the notation here. By construction, for all bins B with |B|= 2−k, k = 0, 1, . . . , k0,
we have IB = K = {1, 2}. Define the event WB,s := {IB ⊆ IB,s} = {IB,s = K} and VB :=
⋂
B′∈P(B)
WB′,tB .
Let
A1 :=
{
∃t ≤ T ; ∃B ∈ Lt;∃s ≤ lB : IB,s 6= K and |B|≥ 2−k0+1
}
denote the event where one of the arms is eliminated in at least one of the bins at depth less than k0.
One has:
P {A1} ≤
k0−1∑
k=1
∑
|B|=2−k
P
{VB ∩ W¯B,tB} . (D.1)
Note that for any bin B with |B|≥ 2−k0+1,
∣∣∣f¯ (1)B − f¯ (2)B ∣∣∣ < c0|B|β≤ B,lB2 . This implies that WB can
only happen if either f¯
(1)
B or f¯
(2)
B does not belong to its respective confidence interval [Y¯
(1)
B,s ± B,s] or
[Y¯
(2)
B,s ± B,s] for some s ≤ lB. Therefore, since −f¯ (i)B ≤ Ys − f¯ (i)B ≤ 1− f¯ (i)B ,
P
{VB ∩ W¯B,tB} ≤ P{∃s ≤ lB;∃i ∈ K : ∣∣∣Y¯ (i)B,s − f¯ (i)B ∣∣∣ ≥ B,s4 } ≤ 4lBT |B|d . (D.2)
Putting together (D.1) and (D.2), one obtains
P {A1} ≤
k0−1∑
k=1
4Cl2
−2βˆk log
(
T2(2βˆ+d)k
)
T2−kd
≤ 4Cl2
−(2βˆ−d)k0 log
(
T 2
)
T
≤ 8ClT
−4 ˆβ
2
ˆ
β+d log T. (D.3)
Step 3. Let c˜ := 21−d−2βˆc−20 log 2 and define
A2 :=
{
∃t ≤ c˜T/2;∃B ∈ Lt : |B|≥ 2−k0+1
}
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to be the event that for some t ≤ c˜T/2 some bin at depth k0 becomes live. Note that for a bin B to
become live by t = bc˜T/2c, we need lp(B) number of contexts to fall into its parent p(B) by t = bc˜T/2c.
Let ZB,t = 1 {Xt ∈ p(B)}. Note that |Zt|≤ 1, EZt = |B|d, and VarZB,t ≤ EZ2B,t = |B|d. Hence, one can
apply the Bernstein’s inequality in Lemma 7.4 to to
bc˜T/2c∑
t=1
ZB,t for |B|= 2−k0 to obtain
P {A2} ≤
∑
|B|=2−k0
P

bc˜T/2c∑
t=1
ZB,t ≥ lp(B)

(a)
≤
∑
|B|=2−k0
P

bc˜T/2c∑
t=1
ZB,t ≥ c−20 |p(B)|−2βˆ

≤ 2k0d exp
(
− c
−4
0 2
4(k0−1)βˆ−1/2
c˜T2(k0−1)d−1 + c−20 22(k0−1)βˆ−1/3
)
= 2k0d exp
(
−c
−2
0 2
2(k0−1)βˆ−1/2
1
2 + 1/3
)
≤ c1T
d
2
ˆ
β+d exp
−c2T 2
ˆ
β
2
ˆ
β+d
 ≤ c3T−1, (D.4)
for some constants c1, c2, c3 > 0, where (a) follows from lB lB ≥ c−20 |B|−2βˆ. by the definition of lB.
Step 4. Let S :=
{
x ∈ [0, 1]d : f1(x) 6= 12
}
. Define the event
A3 :=

bc˜T/2c∑
t=1
1 {Xt ∈ S} < c˜mM−dT/4
 .
Define Zt := 1 {Xt ∈ S} and note that |Zt|≤ 1,EZt = mMd, and VarZt ≤ EZt = mMd. As a result we
can apply the Bernstein’s inequality in Lemma 7.4 to obtain
P {A3} ≤ exp
(
−c˜mM−dT/20
)
≤ exp
−c5T 2
ˆ
β+d−α ˆβ
2
ˆ
β+d
 (a)≤ exp
−c4T 2
ˆ
β
2
ˆ
β+d
 ≤ c5T−1, (D.5)
for some constants c4, c5 > 0, where (a) follows from the assumption that α ≤ 1β ≤ 1ˆβ .
Step 5. Note that on the event A¯1 ∩ A¯2, the ABSE(βˆ) has not eliminated any arms over any region of
the covariate space up to time t = bc˜T/2c. On the other hand, on the event A¯3, up to time t = bc˜T/2c,
at least c˜mM−dT/4 number of contexts have fallen into S, where the first arm is strictly optimal. Recall
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the definition of the inferior sampling rate in (7.1). One has:
SABSE(βˆ)(P;T ) ≥ Epi
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
fpi∗t (Xt) 6= fpit(Xt)
}∣∣∣∣∣A¯1 ∩ A¯2 ∩ A¯3
]
P
{A¯1 ∩ A¯2 ∩ A¯3}
(a)
≥ c˜mM−dT/8
1− 8ClT −4
ˆ
β
2
ˆ
β+d log T − c3T−1 − c5T−1

≥ c6T
α
ˆ
β
2
ˆ
β+d ,
for some constant c6 > 0, where (a) follows from (D.3), (D.4), and (D.5). Using this inequality along
with Lemma 7.1, the result follows. 
D.2 Analysis of Part 2 of Example 1
Step 1. let kˆ :=
⌈
4
2
1
β
∨ 1ˆ
β−β
log2
(
40× 8βd
ˆ
β
2
)⌉
, M := 2kˆ, and B := {Bm, m = 1, . . . ,Md} be a
re-indexed collection of the hypercubes
Bm = Bm :=
{
x ∈ [0, 1]d : mi − 1
2l
≤ xi ≤ mi
2l
, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
}
,
for m = (m1, . . . ,md) with mi ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Let x˜0 :=
(
40d
ˆ
β
2M−βˆ
) 1
β
, and define the function
ψ(x) :=

−L |x1 − x˜0|β + 2Lx˜β0 if 0 ≤ x1 ≤ x˜0
L |x1 − x˜0|β + 2Lx˜β0 if x˜0 ≤ x1 ≤ M
−1
4
L
∣∣∣x1 + x˜0 − M−12 ∣∣∣β + 2Lx˜β0 if M−14 ≤ x1 ≤ M−12 − x˜0
−L
∣∣∣x1 + x˜0 − M−12 ∣∣∣β + 2Lx˜β0 if M−12 − x˜0 ≤ x1 ≤ M−12
L
∣∣∣x1 − x˜0 − M−12 ∣∣∣β if M−12 ≤ x1 ≤ M−12 + x˜0
−L
∣∣∣x1 − x˜0 − M−12 ∣∣∣β if M−12 + x˜0 ≤ x1 ≤ 3M−14
−L
∣∣∣x1 + x˜0 − 3M−14 ∣∣∣β if 3M−14 ≤ x1 ≤M−1 − x˜0
L
∣∣∣x1 + x˜0 − 3M−14 ∣∣∣β if M−1 − x˜0 ≤ x1 ≤M−1
min
(∣∣x−M−1∣∣β + Lx˜β0 , 12) if M−1 ≤ x1 ≤ 1
.
Note that |ψ(x)|≤ 12 . We define the payoff functions as f1(x) := 12 + ψ(x), f2(x) := 1, and assume that
covariates are distributed uniformly. One can show that the margin condition and smoothness condition
in Assumptions 3 and 1 are satisfied for the constructed problem instance.
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Step 2. Next, we lower bound the regret of ABSE(βˆ) under the constructed problem instance. To do so,
we use the same exact terminology and notation as in Perchet and Rigollet (2013); for the sake of brevity,
we do not re-introduce the notation here. Define the set of bins Z := {B ∈ B : ∃x ∈ B : 0 < x1 < M−1}
to include all the bins in B for which their first coordinate is between 0 and M−1. For any bin B, define
WB := {IB,lB = {1}} to be the event that at the end of sampling in B, the only remaining arm is arm 1.
Also, let VB := {1 ∈ IB,lB} be the event that arm 1 is not eliminated at the end of sampling in bin B.
Let A1 :=
⋃
B∈Z W¯B. Note that by construction for any bin B ∈ Z, f¯ (1)B − f¯ (2)B = 10c0|B|βˆ. Furthermore,
for any ancestors of the bins in Z, one has f¯ (1)B − f¯ (2)B > 0 ∀B : |B|> M−1. The last two observations
yield that for any bin B ∈ Z,
WB =
⋂
B′∈P(B)
AB′ ∩ AB.
Hence by (5.8), (5.9), (5.11) in Perchet and Rigollet (2013), for any bin B ∈ Z, one has
P {A1} ≤
∑
B∈Z
P
{W¯B} ≤∑
B∈Z
8
kˆ · lB
TMd
≤ c1 log T
T
, (D.6)
for some constant c1 > 0.
Step 3. Define
A2 :=
{
∃B ∈ LdT
2
e : |B|≥M−1
}
to be the event that at time t = dT2 e there exists any live bin with |B|≥ M−1. Note that by (5.3) in
Perchet and Rigollet (2013), if kˆ · lB ≤ c2 log T, c2 > 0, number of contexts fall inside each bin B ∈ B
then, there will be no live bin with |B|≥ M−1. For any bin B ∈ B, let ZB,t = 1 {Xt ∈ B}. Note that
|ZB,t|≤ 1, EZB,t = |B|d, and VarZB,t ≤ EZ2B,t = |B|d. Hence, one can apply the Bernstein’s inequality in
Lemma 7.4 to
dT
2
e∑
t=1
ZB,t to obtain
P {A2} ≤
∑
B∈B
P

dT
2
e∑
t=1
ZB,t < c2 log T
 ≤ 2ld exp (−c3T ) ≤ c4T−1, (D.7)
for some constants c3, c4 > 0.
Step 4. Let S :=
{
x ∈ [0, 1]d : M−12 + x˜0 < x1 < M−1 − x˜0
}
. Note that M
−1
4 ≤ λ(S) ≤ M
−1
2 , where
λ(·) denotes the Lebesgue measure. Define the event
A3 :=

T∑
t=dc˜T/2e
1 {Xt ∈ S} < TM
−1
16
 .
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Define Zt := 1 {Xt ∈ S} and note that |Zt|≤ 1,EZt = λ(S), and VarZt ≤ EZt = λ(S). Hence, one can
apply the Bernstein’s inequality in Lemma 7.4 to obtain
P {A3} ≤ exp (−c5T ) ≤ c6T−1, (D.8)
for some constants c5, c6 > 0.
Step 5. Note that on the event A¯1 ∩ A¯2, ABSE(βˆ) has eliminated arm 2 for all the bins B ∈ Z, which
contains S. On the other hand, on the event A¯3, from time step t = dT/2e to the end of the time
horizon, at least TM
−1
16 number of contexts have fallen into S, where the second arm is strictly optimal.
Recall the definition of the inferior sampling rate in (7.1). One has:
SABSE(βˆ)(P;T ) ≥ Epi
[
T∑
t=1
1
{
fpi∗t (Xt) 6= fpit(Xt)
}∣∣∣∣∣A¯1 ∩ A¯2 ∩ A¯3
]
P
{A¯1 ∩ A¯2 ∩ A¯3}
(a)
≥ TM
−1
16
(
1− c1 log T
T
− c4T−1 − c6T−1
)
≥ c7T,
for some constant c7 > 0, where (a) follows from (D.6), (D.7), and (D.8). Using this inequality along
with Lemma 7.1, the result follows. 
E Proof of auxiliary lemmas
E.1 Proof of Lemma 7.2
Lemma. Suppose f ∈ HRd(β, L) for some X ∈ Rd, 0 < β ≤ 1 and L > 0, and define the function g
such that g(x) = C−βf(Cx) for all x ∈ Rd and some C > 0. Then, g ∈ HRd(β, L).
Proof. For any x, y ∈ Rd, one has
|g(x)− g(y)| = C−β |f(Cx)− f(Cy)| ≤ C−βL ‖Cx− Cy‖β∞ = L ‖x− y‖β∞ .
This concludes the proof. 
E.2 Proof of Lemma 7.3
Lemma. Suppose f, g ∈ HX (β, L) for some X ⊆ Rd, 0 < β ≤ 1 and L > 0, and define the functions
h1 := max(f, g) and h2 := min(f, g). Then, h1, h2 ∈ HX (β, L).
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Proof. We only prove the result for the function h1. A similar analysis can be used for h2. Fix some
x, y ∈ X . If h1(x) = f(x) and h1(y) = f(y), or h1(x) = g(x) and h1(y) = g(y) then, one has
|h1(x)− h1(y)|≤ L‖x− y‖β∞.
Now suppose h1(x) = f(x) and h1(y) = g(y). Without loss of generality, assume that f(x) ≤ g(y) then,
one has
|h1(x)− h1(y)|≤ |g(x)− g(y)|≤ L‖x− y‖β∞.
The case h1(x) = f(x) and h1(y) = g(y) can be analyzed similarly. This concludes the proof. 
E.3 Proof of Lemma 7.5
Lemma. Let ρ0, ρ1 be two probability distributions supported on some set X , with ρ0 absolutely continuous
with respect to ρ1. Then for any measurable function Ψ : X → {0, 1}, one has:
Pρ0{Ψ(X) = 1}+ Pρ1{Ψ(X) = 0} ≥
1
2
exp(−KL(ρ0, ρ1)).
Proof. Define B to be the event that Ψ(X) = 1. One has
Pρ0{Ψ(X) = 1}+ Pρ1{Ψ(X) = 0} = Pρ0{B}+ Pρ1{B¯} ≥
∫
min{dρ0, dρ1} ≥ 1
2
exp(−KL(ρ0, ρ1)),
where the last inequality follows from Tsybakov 2008, Lemma 2.6. 
E.4 Proof of Lemma A.4
Lemma. Suppose f, g ∈ HX (β, L) for some X ⊆ [0, 1], β > 0, and L > 0, and define the function
h := f · g as the product of f and g. Then, h ∈ H(β, L′) for some L′ > 0.
Proof. Note that h is bβc times continuously differentiable. Hence, we only need to show that there
exists some L′ > 0 such that for any x, x′ ∈ X ,∣∣h(x′)− hx(x′)∣∣ ≤ L′‖x− x′‖β∞.
By the triangle inequality, one has
∣∣h(x′)− hx(x′)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣(f · g)x(x′)− fx(x′) · gx(x′)∣∣+ ∣∣fx(x′) · g(x′)− fx(x′) · gx(x′)∣∣
+
∣∣fx(x′) · g(x′)− f(x′) · g(x′)∣∣ . (E.1)
Since X ⊆ [0, 1] and f, g ∈ HX (β, L), one has for some L1, L2 > 0:
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∣∣fx(x′) · g(x′)− fx(x′) · gx(x′)∣∣ = |fx(x′)|· ∣∣g(x′)− gx(x′)∣∣ ≤ L1‖x− x′‖β∞; (E.2)
∣∣fx(x′) · g(x′)− f(x′) · g(x′)∣∣ = ∣∣fx(x′)− f(x′)∣∣ |g(x′)|≤ L2‖x− x′‖β∞. (E.3)
Furthermore, let {as}0≤s≤bβc, {bs}0≤s≤bβc, and {cs}0≤s≤bβc be the coefficients of the Taylor expansions
fx(x
′), gx(x′), and hx(x′), respectively. Notably, cs =
∑s
s′=0 as′bs−s′ . This equality implies that
∣∣(f · g)x(x′)− fx(x′) · gx(x′)∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2bβc∑
s=bβc+1
s∑
s′=0
as′bs−s′(x− x′)s
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ L3‖x− x′‖β∞, (E.4)
for some L3 > 0. Then, the result follows from putting together (E.1), (E.2), (E.3), and (E.4). 
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